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Abstract  
For nearly two decades, Europe was considered a stable and peaceful continent. Following 
several crises, including the annexation of Crimea and Brexit, the future of European 
integration is being questioned. Despite being on different sides of the ideological spectrum, 
European far right and far left political parties have one characteristic in common with each 
other and Russia: euroscepticism. This thesis aims at examining the effect of euroscepticism 
on peripheral parties’ voting behaviour in votes in the European Parliament that can 
undermine Russia and Russia’s interests and objectives. The hypothesis claims that the higher 
the degree of euroscepticism, the more likely is the peripheral party to vote in line with 
Russia’s interests.  
 
This theory is tested quantitatively and an OLS multivariate regression analysis is conducted. 
The results show, after introducing five control variables, that euroscepticism has no 
significant effect on peripheral parties voting behaviour in votes regarding Russia. However, 
the analysis shows that parties holding a government position are less likely to vote in line 
with Russia’s interests and parties that show anti-establishment senitments are more likely to 
vote in line with Russia’s interests. This knowledge is important, in order to understand 
which potential influence Russia can have on European peripheral parties.   
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Abbreviations   
 
AA    Association Agreement 
AET    The Other Europe with Tsipras (L'Altra Europa con Tsipras) 
AfD    Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland) 
AKEL Progressive Party of Working People (Anorthotikó Kómma 
Ergazómenou Laoú) 
BE    Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda) 
CDU Unitary Democratic Coalition (Coligação Democrática 
Unitária) 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
DCFTA   Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
DF    Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) 
EaP    Eastern Partnership 
EC    European Community  
ECU    Eurasian Customs Union  
EEAS    European Union External Action Service  
EFFD    Europe of Freedom and Democracy 
EL    The Party of European Left 
ENF    Europe of Nations and Freedom 
EP    European Parliament  
EU    European Union 
FG    Left Front (Front de gauche) 
FN    National Front (Front National) 
FPÖ    Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs)  
Greens/EFA   Greens-European Free Alliance 
GUE/NGL   European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
IGO    Intergovernmental organization 
IP    Plural Left (La Izquierda Plural) 
IU    United Left (Izquierda Unida) 
ISIL    Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
KKE Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas) 
LAE    Popular Unity (Laïkí Enótita) 
LGBT    Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 
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LN    North League (Lega Nord)  
MEP    Member of the European Parliament 
NA National Alliance "All For Latvia!" – "For Fatherland and 
Freedom/LNNK (Nacionālā apvienība „Visu Latvijai!” – 
„Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK”) 
NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
NI Non-Instricts 
NPD National Democratic Party of Germany 
(Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) 
PCA    Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation 
PCF    French Communist Party (Parti communiste français) 
PCP Portuguese Communist Party (Coligação Democrática 
Unitária) 
PEV Ecologist Party “The Greens” (Partido Ecologista "Os 
Verdes") 
PG    Left Party (France) (Parti de Gauche) 
PM    Perceptions management  
PS    Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) 
PVV    Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid) 
RT    Russia Today 
SACEUR   Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
SD    Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) 
SF    Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti) 
SP    Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij) 
TT    Order and Justice (Partija tvarka ir teisingumas) 
TTIP    Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
UI    United Left (Izquierda Unida) 
UKIP    UK Independence Party  
V    Left Party (Sweden) (Vänsterpartiet) 
VAS    Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto) 
VB    Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) 
XA Popular Association – Golden Dawn (Laïkós Sýndesmos – 
Chrysí Avgí) 
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1 Introduction    
 
For nearly two decades after the end of the Cold War, Europe was characterized as a peaceful 
and politically stable continent and the European Union (EU) was seen as a successful model 
for regional integration (Veebel & Markus 2015).  
 
This perception of Europe would remain for nearly two decades. Then came the Eurozone 
crisis in 2009, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-08, the Ukraine crises in 2014 
and the refugee crisis in 2015. All of these events have made Europeans question the future 
of Europe and nationalistic forces are gaining ground all over Europe. Crisis after crisis and 
challenge after challenge has started to erode member states’ solidarity and belief in the EU’s 
capacity to solve common issues (Trauner 2016; Veebel & Markus 2015). The latest blow to 
the European project came on 23 June 2016 when the British people decided on leaving the 
EU and initiated the so called ‘Brexit’. This reflects the distrust many Europeans feel for the 
European institutions (Erlanger 2016). 
 
The geopolitical map started to change in Europe on 18 March 2014. This was the day when 
Russia annexed Crimea, a peninsula that had belonged to Ukraine since 1954. (Ukraine: Putin 
signs Crimea annexation 2014). For several months before this event, Ukraine had been in a 
state of political turmoil. Ukraine had the intention to sign the Ukraine-European Union 
Association Agreement (AA), which initiates an association between the EU and countries in 
the so called Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries (EEAS 2016a): Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (EEAS 2016b). In the case of Ukraine, the AA 
would also establish a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the 
European Union (EEAS 2016a). On 21 November 2013, Ukraine’s former President Viktor 
Yanikovych decided not to sign it, and to instead form closer ties with Russia. This sparked a 
demonstration among pro-EU protesters, known as the ‘Euromaidan’, which led to 
Yanikovych removal in February 2014. Pro-Russian separatists began a bloody secession for 
the Crimean peninsula (Chance 2014; Grytsenko 2014) that became a reality in March 2014. 
The war between pro-Russian separatists, provided with Russian military support, and the 
Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine is still ongoing today (Walker 2015).   
During the process, which led up to the annexation, so called proxies, who assisted in 
promoting Russia’s foreign policy abroad, helped spark the uprising among pro-Russian 
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separatists in Crimea through soft power cohesion (Lutsevych 2016). Lutsevych (2016) 
claims that the proxies were disguised as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) under 
Russian law and funded by the government in order to undermine the EU and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to promote Russian values and objectives.  
 
Since 2014, it has been reported that Russia might be using proxies from inside the EU, in 
order to represent the Russian narrative of Europe’s overwhelming challenges and to 
undermine the European project and NATO from within (Schindler 2016). For example, 
Western representatives have claimed that Russia tries to “exacerbate the refugee crisis and 
use it as a weapon to divide the transatlantic alliance and undermine the European project”1 
and that Russia is “deliberately weaponizing migration in an attempt to overwhelm European 
structures and break European resolve”2. Jones (2016) reports that according to European 
politicians, diplomats and intelligence agencies, Russia’s involvement in Syria is an example 
of this.   
 
European far right political parties, that often are skeptical towards immigration, tend to find 
Russia’s narrative about e.g. the refugee crisis alluring and since 2014, several media reports 
claim that there is a connection between Russia and the European far right political parties, if 
not direct than indirect (see Foster 2016; Klapsis 2015; Political Capital Policy Research and 
Consulting Institute 2014; Schindler 2016). According to Foster (2016), information 
operations have been traced in various countries in Europe and France, the Netherlands, 
Hungary, Austria and Czech Republic are mentioned as specific examples. Wagstyl (2016) 
mentions an example of a story that Russian media spread in January 2016, around the same 
time that it was discovered that several women had been sexually assaulted by men of Middle 
Eastern or Northern African heritage in Cologne. Russian media reported that a Russian-
German 13-year old girl had been raped by men of that same heritage. This caused unrest 
amongst the Germans, especially amongst the Russian-Germans, and support for the far right 
party Alternative for Germany (AfD) increased (Wagstyl 2016). According to Boffey (2014) 
and Harding (2014), funding received by far right parties can also be traced back to Russia. 
France’s far right party National Front (FN) has confirmed that it has lent 9,4 million euros 
from a Russian bank and has openly showed support for Russia’s domestic and foreign                                                          
1 United States Senator John McCain, speech at the Munich Security Conference, Germany on 14 February 
2016.  
2 U.S. Air Force General Philip Breedlove, speech in the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington D.C, 
USA, on 25 February 2016.  
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policies (Harding 2014). For the election in Crimea in March 2014, Russia invited election 
observers. Several European far right political parties participated, e.g. the Freedom Party of 
Austria (FPÖ), Belgian Flemish Interest (VB), FN, Hungarian Jobbik and Italian North 
League (LN) (Klapsis 2015) as well as the German far left party Die Linke (Orenstein 2014).  
 
Harding (2014) (see also Klapsis 2015; Political Capital Policy Research and Consulting 
Institute 2014) claims that the fascination that the European far right parties have with Russia 
is partly based on ideology - nationalism and conservatism - but mostly because they share a 
common denominator: skepticism toward the EU. The European far left political parties also 
share skepticism towards the EU with Russia and the far right parties. Boffey (2016) notes 
this as well and claims that by creating allies from political parties in the periphery of the left-
right political spectrum, Russia will be able to increase its influence in the EU. It would also 
be able to undermine NATO, ultimately revoke the economic sanctions imposed on Russia 
after the annexation of Crimea (Boffey 2016) and ensure that the EU does not find 
alternatives to Russian energy (Foster 2016; Orenstein 2014).  
 
This thesis will examine which effect euroscepticism, defined as an opposition to the EU as a 
result of scepticism towards the process of European integration (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012; 
Taggart 1998), as a common denominator of Russia and the European far right and left 
political parties, influences these parties voting behavior in the European Parliament (EP) in 
votes regarding Russia and Russia’s interests and objectives. As stated by Makarychev and 
Yatsyk (2014) it is important for European policy makers and academia to try to understand 
Russia’s narratives and motives, in order to develop proper policies. Today, peripheral parties 
do not have power to substantially effect EU policies in the EP. However, Klapsis (2015) and 
Orenstein (2014) state that many far right parties are enjoying electoral success in the EP 
elections, which means that an increased amount of the Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) are representatives for their opinions. In Appendix 1, a table of all included far right 
and far left political parties used in this thesis are included. This table also shows which 
political group in the EP these parties belong to and includes a comparison of their electoral 
success in the 2009 and 2014 EP elections. Far right parties like FPÖ, Danish People’s Party 
(DF), FN, UK Independence Party (UKIP) and Greece’s Golden Dawn (XA) have increased 
their seats in the EP in the 2014 EP election as well as far left parties like Greece’s SYRIZA, 
Spain’s United Left (UI) and Podemos and Portugal’s Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). 
These parties can be seen as challengers of the EU’s cohesion.  
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This study is an important addition to the existing literature as it will give an insight to 
European voters about what consequences their votes in European Parliament elections might 
have for the peace and stability in Europe. Their voting behaviour on an EU level might also 
reflect the way that they try to affect policies on a national level (Klapsis 2015). Polyakova 
(2014) claims that the development on an EU level can reflect important national 
developments. She mentions the UK Independence Party (UKIP) as an example of a party 
that has not received much influence on a national level but yet more in the EP. Politics in the 
EU can at a later stage lead to shift on a national level as well (Polyakova 2014).  
As for this study’s further contribution to academia, currently only a few studies exist on the 
connection between Russia and far right political parties and as Klapsis (2015) highlights, 
this is a newly discovered issue, which captures that what academic research is currently 
missing to a large extent.  This phenomenon is much more widely covered by journalists 
(Klapsis 2015). Other studies (see Klapsis 2015; Laruelle 2015) have only focussed on a 
limited amount of European far right parties, some of which do not have a seat in the EP like 
the Bulgarian party Attack. The aim of this thesis is to look at all European peripheral parties 
with at least one seat in the EP, both to the far right and left. This will be done quantitatively 
and will be the first study of its kind trying to understand and explain the voting behaviour 
among peripheral parties, with regards to resolutions on Russia and Russia’s interests. 
Previous studies (see Braghiroli & Makarychev 2016; Klapsis 2015; Laruelle et al. 2015) 
have only examined the linkage between Russia and far right and left parties by studying a 
smaller amount of political parties qualitatively with the use of e.g. manifestos and statements 
(see Klapsis 2015). Note that only one study exists (see Braghiroli & Makarychev 2016) 
where both far right and left are included.  
 
From now on far right and left parties will be called peripheral parties, which reflect their 
position on the left-right political spectrum, in accordance with Taggart’s concept (1998). 
Throughout this thesis, the word ‘far’ serves as an umbrella term, under which ‘radical’ and 
‘extreme’ fall. As Mudde (2007) explains, radical parties stand up for democracy but are 
critical about its liberal nature, whereas extreme parties are not democratic in the sense that 
they oppose that power is derived from the people (Mudde 2007:31).  
 
According to Braghiroli and Makarychev (2016) the peripheral political parties show a 
tendency to adapt their narratives in a way, which aligns with Russia’s foreign policy. This 
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includes undermining the EU and NATO and limiting the EU’s influence in the EaP 
countries. However, these parties will not be called pro-Russian throughout this thesis, as this 
might exaggerate the connection. A direct connection cannot and will not be examined in this 
thesis. Therefore, calling these parties “sensitive to Russia’s interests” (Braghiroli & 
Makarychev’s 2016:217) is more suiting. It is also important to note that just because the 
peripheral parties and Russia generate similar narratives, it does not mean that these parties 
necessarily run Russia’s errands in the EU. Stories like these are mostly based on Western 
media reporting and claiming this would not have a positive effect on EU-Russia relations. 
Klapsis (2015) calls it an “unofficial alliance” (Klapsis 2015:15), which is a basic assumption 
throughout this thesis. However, the results of this study will show if the possibility exists 
that these parties are or might become influenced by Russia. Finally, for the sake of 
transparency, the author of this thesis is a Swedish national and could therefore be claimed to 
generate a European and/or Western perspective.  
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2 Aim and research questions  
The aim of this thesis is to understand and explain why peripheral parties vote the way they 
do in the EP. A shared euroscepticism unites Russia and the European peripheral parties, 
which makes them share the objective to undermine the EU and hinder further European 
integration. With the common characteristic – euroscepticism - this thesis will try to explain 
the voting behaviour amongst these peripheral parties, when it comes to votes on resolutions 
that regard and undermine Russia and/or Russia’s interests and objectives. It is a basic 
assumption throughout this thesis that Russia and the European peripheral parties share the 
objective to undermine the EU, which opens up for the possibility for Russia to influence 
these parties with Russian soft power tools. Whether this connection already exists today, 
will be up for speculation in this thesis, but the knowledge can prepare policy makers and 
European voters that such a connection can occur.  
 
The aim of this thesis generates the following research question:  
 
¾ What effect does the degree of euroscepticism have on European peripheral parties’ 
voting behaviour in European parliament votes that, directly or indirectly, regard Russia 
and/or Russia’s interests and objectives? 
 
The following hypothesis will be tested in order to see if it can answer the research question 
and derives from the theoretical discussion that will be displayed later in this thesis: 
 
H1: The higher the degree of euroscepticism, the more likely is the peripheral party to vote in 
line with Russia’s interests.  
 
As will be discussed in more detail in the methodology and data section below, all European 
far right and far left political parties (EU-28) will be included as long as they hold at least one 
seat in the EP. These parties are listed in appendix 1. The votes on resolutions all regard four 
Russian interests and/or objections: 1. further European integration, 2. (in)dependence on 
Russian energy, 3. encouragement of economic sanctions against Russia and 4. criticism of 
Russia and/or Russia’s actions in Ukraine.  
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3 Previous research   
This section will present previous research with the aim of providing a contextual 
background that explains how Russia could and would want to affect European peripheral 
parties. This is presented in order to show in which wider context peripheral parties’s voting 
behaviour should be understood. First, the concept of soft power and how information can be 
seen as a soft power tool will be explained. Then, the Russian usage of information as a soft 
power tool will be discussed. This section ends with a sub-section explaining the nature of 
EU-Russia relations and Russia’s interests in the EU, which will help in the development of 
the dependent variable for the upcoming quantitative analysis and increase the understanding 
of why Russia would want to influence European peripheral parties.  
 
3.1 Information - a soft power tool  
 
In 1990, Joseph Nye fathered the concept of Soft Power, which he predicted to become more 
important in a post-Cold War era (Nye 1990). Nye describes power as follows:   
 
Power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want. One can affect others’ behaviour 
in three main ways: threats of coercion (“sticks”), inducement and payments (“carrots”), and attraction 
that makes others want what you want (Nye 2008:94).  
 
As the quote states, in order to affect others to act in accordance with your own interests and 
objectives, power can be wielded through coercion, economic incentives or attraction. In 
accordance with Nye’s framework, power through coercion and economic incentives are 
expressions of hard power. Hard power is often measured in the amount of military 
capabilities that a state has in comparison to other states, with the ultimate goal of creating a 
balance of power (Nye 1990). Nye (2008) argues, that states cannot rely only on hard power 
tools but that a so called ‘smart power strategy’ must also lean on soft power tools. Nye 
(2008) explains soft power as follows:  
 
A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, 
admiring its values, emulating its example, and/or aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness. In 
this sense it is important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force 
them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons. This soft power – getting 
others to want the outcomes you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them (Nye 2008:94).  
 
Nye (208) describes four soft power tools: culture, domestic political values, including 
ideology (Nye 1990), and domestic and foreign policies (Nye 2008). As will be shown later 
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in this thesis, the two latter are applicable to Russia’s influence on European peripheral 
political parties. Political values seem credible when they are lived up to in both domestic as 
well as in foreign settings and foreign policies when they are perceived as being legitimate 
and showing moral authority.  
 
In comparison to hard power, not only states can influence other states with soft power. Also 
other actors are referees and receivers of soft power (Nye 1990; Nye 2008), as can be seen in 
table 1. This is explained by the spread of and rapid development of modern technology, 
which has initiated the information era that currently characterizes how the world interacts. 
However, it is not the spreading of information that is challenging for governments, media 
outlets, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and companies but rather the competition for the attraction of the receivers when information 
is abundant. A referee with extensive soft power manages to get the receivers to see its 
information as credible and legitimate, and succeeds in aligning the interest of others with its 
own (Nye 2008). This is what Russia is trying to do, as will be explained below. Peripheral 
political parties can be or become receivers of soft power, while Russia is the referee. As 
explained, whether Russia is successful in this will not be established in this thesis, but by 
explaining the voting behaviour of European peripheral parties, the possibility for Russia to 
influence these parties will be understood. 
 
 
Sources of Soft Power Referees for Credibility or 
Legitimacy 
Receivers of Soft Power 
Foreign policies Governments, media, NGOs, 
IGOs  
Foreign governments and 
publics 
Domestic values and policies Media, NGOs, IGOs Foreign governments and 
publics 
High culture Governments, NGOs, IGOs Foreign governments and 
publics 
Pop culture Media, markets Foreign publics 
Table 1. Summarizing table of Nye’s definition of soft power tools, referees and receivers 
(Nye 2008:107).  
 
 
Nye (2008) and Yablokov (2015) see soft power as an important part of public diplomacy, 
which Yablokov defines as a “way of engaging foreign individuals, communities and 
governments in support of national objectives and foreign policies of an international actor 
stimulated by the development of global communication” (Yablokov 2015:303).  
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3.1.1 Information – A Russian soft power tool  
 
Russia has used information as a soft power tool to annex Crimea (Ambrosio 2016). 
According to Galeotti (2016) and Snegovaya (2015) information operations3 is a soft power 
tool based on disinformation campaigns, the spread of propaganda and subversion. These are 
used in order to be able to deny, deceive and conceal current objectives, get the strategic 
advantage and shape agendas in a cost-effective manner (Galeotti 2016; Snegovaya 2015). 
This relates to Nye’s (1990) assumption that hard power is too costly in a post-Cold War era, 
e.g. because of the threat of mutual destruction considering e.g. nuclear weapons, whereas 
soft power tools are cost-effective. More precisely, Snegovaya defines information operations 
as “means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline 
him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action” 
(Snegovaya 2015:10). This definition aligns well with Nye’s soft power concept i.e. that a 
referee aims at aligning the receiver’s interests and objectives with its own. Ambrosio (2016) 
introduces a similar approach that explains how and why perceptions are framed in a certain 
way in order to achieve current objectives. Perception management seeks to “create a self-
interested narrative to define the contours of debate, justify one’s actions at home and abroad, 
and provides those actions with legal and normative legitimacy” (Ambrosio 2016:468).  
 
Information operations can be understood as a part of the broader concept of hybrid warfare. 
Hybrid warfare became an important concept to understand after it was used for the 
annexation of Crimea on 18 March 2014, which European decision-makers neither foresaw 
nor were able to respond to (e.g. Bachmann & Gunneriusson 2015; Galeotti 2016; McIntosh 
2015; Snegovaya 2015). Hybrid warfare4 implies a usage of a combination of conventional 
and unconventional warfare tactics, such as regular and irregular forces, economic warfare, 
cyber attacks, diplomacy and information warfare (Bunde & Oroz 2015). One can also claim 
that hybrid warfare applies both hard and soft power tools, which Nye calls “smart power” 
(Nye 2008:108). Ultimately, the adversary becomes confused as the line between war and 
peace gets blurred (Bachmann & Gunneriusson 2015), which hinders countermeasures 
(Snegovaya 2016).  
 
                                                         3 Other terms include ’information warfare’ (e.g. Snegovaya 2015) and ’perception management’ (Ambrosio 
2016).  
4 Other occuring terms: ’full-spectrum warfare’, ’non-linear war’, ’new-generation warfare’ (Galeotti 2016).  
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Trying to achieve objectives and interests through aligning others interests with your own is 
not a new phenomenon – not to Russia, European countries or the U.S. Already in 1883, 
France tried to restore its credibility and reputation following the defeat in the Franco-
Russian war through the spread of French culture. Other examples include, but are not 
limited to, Germany and the United Kingdom trying to establish a good reputation in the U.S. 
before the American involvement in World War I. Another example is the radio broadcasting 
in the 1920s and 1930s to spread the ideologies of Fascism, Nazism and Communism abroad, 
which the U.S. tried to counter in countries and regions that could be perceptible to this 
information. Today, the United Kingdom and the U.S. use the BBC World Service and the 
U.S. Information Agency respectively, in order to spread information and to remain 
reputable. As for Russia, information has been used as a soft power tool since the Soviet 
times in the 1950s. In post-Cold War times, Russia used it in the 2008 Russia-Georgia 
conflict (Snegovaya 2015; Yablokov 2015) and in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. However, 
Yablokov (2015) notes that in comparison to the use of information during the times of the 
Soviet Union, in order to exploit ideological divisions between capitalism and communism, 
there are no strong ideological dimensions in current Russian information operations 
(Yablokov 2015). 
 
As of today, the Russian media is to a large extent government-controlled (Galeotti 2016; 
Snegovaya 2015). These media outlets, e.g. e.g. Russia Today (since 2009 only called RT) 
and Sputnik, are also aiming on influencing global audiences by operating media outlets in 
foreign languages (Snegovaya 2015). Through these channels, Russia actively tries to 
undermine the West, in particular the U.S, divide the EU and NATO, and spread insecurity 
among the European publics (Galeotti 2016). McIntosh (2015) claims that Russian media 
alternates the perspective in order to mobilize public support for its own objectives. 
 
This tactic was noted in Ukraine, when Russia aimed at preventing Ukraine deepening its 
cooperation with the EU and NATO (Snegovaya 2015). Ambrosio (2016) discusses how 
perception management was used in information operations to justify and legitimize the 
annexation of Crimea in March 2014, both domestically and abroad in order to handle the 
criticism from the West (see also Yablokov 2015). First, Russia claimed that the annexation 
was legitimate because it was a result of self-determination of the Crimean people to annex 
and accede to Russia. Second, Russia could claim Crimea on the basis of historical and 
cultural ties and because the transfer of Crimea under Soviet rule in 1954 was illegitimate. 
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Third, due to Western criticism, Russia accused the West of being anti-Russian. Galeotti 
(2016) adds that Russia accused Kiev of being neo-fascists. Other narratives include the 
shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight 17, where Russia claimed that the U.S. might have 
been a part of a conspiracy (McIntosh 2015:304) and that the demonstrations in Kiev – the so 
called Euromaidan – were encouraged by the U.S. and which forced former pro-Russian 
President Yanukovich to resign (Polyakova 2014).  
 
Yablokov (2015) studies the role of conspiracy theories in RT’s media reporting and comes 
to the conclusion that RT aims at delegitimizing the U.S. domestic and foreign policy and 
tries to increase the trust and confidence in Russia in order to legitimize Russia’s domestic 
and foreign policies. Since the adaptation of the Doctrine of Information Security in 2000, it 
has become more important for Russia to spread knowledge about Russian culture and to 
offer an alternative to Western media. The establishment of RT in 2005 was in line with these 
objectives. After the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, which got heavily criticized by the West 
Russia started to rethink its foreign policy tools. Targeting international audiences became 
crucial to Russia and RT was established in multiple foreign languages (Dias 2013; Yablokov 
2015).  
 
Snegovaya (2015) discusses the effect that Russian information, spread through Russian 
media outlets, can have on peripheral parties. According to her, European peripheral parties 
are being targeted with the aim of destabilizing the European political environment. By 
exploiting current European challenges and national vulnerabilities in Europe, Russia effects 
public sentiments, which often show a eurosceptical and anti U.S. narrative. European 
peripheral parties to both the political left and right are sensitive to this narrative as will be 
explained later in this thesis. Galeotti (2016) explains the intelligence agencies develop 
relationships with proxies as part of a long-term strategy, irrespective of ethnic or ideological 
ties. As mentioned by Yablokov (2015), ideology plays less of an important role now than 
during the Cold War when establishing a proxy-relationship, but Galeotti (2016) claims that 
there has to exist an ideological allure as well, although it might not be the most essential 
common denominator. Further, by adapting the media message, Russia is able to target 
different audiences without a strong ideological link (Yablokov 2015). It will be an 
assumption throughout this thesis that the common characteristic that both Russia, the far 
right and the far left share, is euroscepticism. Undermining and dissolving the EU is their 
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common strategy. Therefore, traditional left-right ideology is assumed to play less of a role in 
affecting peripheral parties voting behaviour.   
 
3.2 Russia’s interests in the European Union   
3.2.1 Russia’s great power discourse  
In order to be able to understand Russia’s interests in the EU and the dividing lines in EU-
Russia relations, one must understand the overall driving force behind Russia’s rhetoric and 
actions. This understanding is based on a great power discourse, which affects both domestic 
and foreign policy and which has always affected EU-Russia relations in the past 
(Makarychev & Yatsyk 2014; Smith 2014). It is important to Russia to be a great power in 
world politics and this trait is deeply rooted in the Russian identity. According to Smith 
(2014), it is important to understand the difference between considering oneself to be a great 
power and being considered as a great power by another. Smith (2014) claims that the 
difference lies in whether or not a state has acquired status or not and that status can only be 
acquired when a state gets recognised by others as a great power. She also explains that great 
powers usually share three characteristics: 1. they are to a high degree involved in conflicts 
and international politics, in which 2.  they are considered important players, and 3. their 
great power status is valued and supported domestically (Smith 2014). 
 
After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia’s great power 
status vanished rapidly, however, Russia’s great power identity did not. Russia’s involvement 
in conflicts, e.g. the first and second Chechen wars in the 1990s (Smith 2014), the 2008 
Russo-Georgian war and the ongoing 2014 war in Eastern Ukraine (Makarychev & Yatsyk 
2014) as well as the Russian military involvement in the Syrian Civil War, are all examples 
of this (Yablokov 2015). Russia is not necessarily anti-Western, however, it wants to be seen 
as an equal and it wants to balance the power between Europe and the U.S – a so called 
“concert of great powers” (Braghiroli & Makarychev 2016:217).  
 
Simultaneously, it has become important to Russia to distance itself from the West. Russia 
highly values its sovereignty and claims to be fighting for other peoples’ right to sovereignty. 
As shown, this rhetoric has been used in the annexation of Crimea in order to legitimize 
Russian actions (Makarychev & Yatsyk 2014). 
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3.2.2 EU-Russia relations  
After the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine, EU-Russian 
relations have reached a low-point. Haukkala (2015) claims that the annexation was an 
intended act by Russia in order to break free from the EU’s institutional arrangements. 
Haukkala (2015) and Makarychev and Yatsyk (2014) attest to the rocky relationship between 
Russia and the EU, ever since the end of the Cold War. In the beginning of the 1990s, the EU 
set up cooperative, irreversible structures with Russia. By doing this, the EU thought it would 
be able to tie Russia to the EU, both culturally and economically and to tie Russia to 
promises of devotion to democracy and human rights, which could ensure a peaceful and 
stable Europe. Russia thinks that these structures were unilaterally imposed on them and 
opposed further integration between 1994 and 2000. Meanwhile, Russia established a new 
foreign policy with an increased focus on its sphere of influence, sovereignty and equal 
partnership with the EU. Several military conflicts, like the Russian involvement in the two 
wars in Chechnya and the EU’s support for the NATO-led military invention in Kosovo 
against Serbia, caused further disagreements. In the beginning of the 2000s, Russia showed 
an interest for further Europeanization. This soon changed, when the EU began to question 
Russia’s devotion to democracy, as Russia centralized the president’s power to the expense 
of undermining checks and balances, in order to handle internal and external challenges such 
as Chechen separatism and terrorism (Haukkala 2015). Russia also experienced economic 
growth between 2000 and 2007, which decreased the dependence on the EU (Dias 2013).  
 
Today, Russia’s dislike for the EU institutions rests on four characteristics of the EU. First, 
its liberal culture, which ensures LGBT persons social rights and relies on what they call 
‘American’ culture. Russia knows that as long as this liberal culture defines Europe, Russia 
will not be considered an equal partner, which is not in line with their ambition to be seen as 
a great power in world politics.  Second, Russia dislikes the inefficiency and bureaucracy of 
the EU system. Third, according to Russia the EU is too perceptible to influences and 
interference from the U.S. and NATO and thus requires outdistancing. Last, Russia claims 
that fascism is fostering in Europe e.g. in the Baltic States and Ukraine (Braghiroli & 
Makarychev 2016).  
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3.2.3 European integration  
An EU initiative called the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched in 2009 in order to 
promote values like democracy and human rights in countries like Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine (Haukkala 2015). These belong to Russia’s traditional sphere of influence and 
Russia disagreed with these countries preferring cooperation with the EU instead of 
cooperation with Russia (Dias 2013). Russia also saw this as a way for the EU to undermine 
Russia as a regional power in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. One year later, in 
2010, Russia established the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) together with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan as an alternative to the EU’s liberal discourse and in order to institutionalize 
Russia’s sphere of influence. This sphere of influence, which the EU calls their shared 
neighbourhood, is a source of disagreements in the EU-Russia relations. As an example, Dias 
(2013) claims that the war in Eastern Ukraine can be seen as a proxy war between the EU and 
Russia in the fight for a neighbourhood that they do not like to be share, as influencing these 
countries means establishing international security and economic growth. With less 
legitimacy and support for the EU and Russia’s contracting economy, it has become even 
more important to influence these countries. For Russia it is also needed to keep internal 
cohesion and relevance as a great power (Dias 2013; Trenin 2009). Russia wants to be 
respected in its sphere of influence. This applies to the countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), which includes countries such as Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, 
especially since the accession of the Baltic States and Poland into NATO. NATO moving 
further to the East is seen as a threat to Russia. Crucial to Russia is also to protect ethnic-
Russians in their sphere of influence5 (Trenin 2009). 
 
As mentioned, Russia’s sphere of influence, also called the shared neighbourhood by the EU, 
has been a source of disagreements between the EU and Russia. In November 2013, the 
Eastern Partnership Summit was held in Vilnius, Lithuania and the decisions made there can 
be said to have led up to the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine. During the 
summit, the EU decided to increase its cooperation with Armenia, Moldova, Georgia and 
Ukraine, i.e. countries in Russia’s sphere of influence, by signing the Association 
Agreements’ (AA). These paved the way for the more comprehensive ‘Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area’ (DCFTA). To keep these countries from signing the AAs,                                                          
5 Trenin (2009) calls this ’sphere of interests’, as today Russia is only interested in certain sectors, e.g. political, 
military or economic sector, and not whole countries as during the Cold war.  
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Russia put political and economic pressure on them by using these countries dependence on 
Russian energy as leverage and implementing economic sanctions on certain goods. The 
Ukrainian President Yanukovych was offered several economic incentives on Russian natural 
gas, preferential loans and trade agreements. The result was that only Georgia and Moldova 
signed their AAs (Haukkala 2015). After the Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea and 
President Yanukovych’s resignation, Ukraine’s new President Petro Poroshensko ratified the 
AA in September 2014 (Haukkala 2015).  
 
3.2.4 (In)dependence on Russian energy  
Energy is one of the means to which Russia proves itself to be a great power, together with 
military capabilities and information. As seen in several countries in Russia’s sphere of 
influence, Russia can use energy to put pressure or encourage countries to align with Russia’s 
interests. For this to continue, countries need to remain dependent on Russian energy 
resources and Europe is to a large degree dependent on Russian energy, especially natural 
gas. Krickovic (2015) sees a classic security dilemma in EU-Russia energy relations, which 
means that when one of them decreases the interdependence on the other’s energy supply, the 
other needs to do the same. Interdependence between actors is often claimed to foster 
cooperation and dialogue, according to Krickovic (2015), but because of Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine, the EU has tried to decrease its dependence on Russian energy resources. The EU 
has confirmed this in the 2014 European Union Energy Security Strateg. This puts Russia in 
a situation which negatively affects its economic situation as well as threatens its security 
because of less cooperation (Krickovic 2015). 
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4 Theory   
This section will present the limited research that exists on the connection between European 
peripheral parties and Russia and their common denominator – euroscepticism – with the aim 
of theoretically being able to explore what effect euroscepticism can have on peripheral 
parties voting behaviour in EP votes on resolutions regarding Russia’s interests. Peripheral 
parties’ relationship with euroscepticism will also be explored.  
 
4.1 Euroscepticism – crossing ideological boundaries  
The previous chapters have discussed how information can be used and adapted in order to 
influence various actors, including European peripheral political parties, in order for them to 
act as Russia’s proxies in the European parliament. This has been done in order to explore 
which potential influence Russia can have on these parties. As mentioned, there is more 
research, as well as media reporting, on far right parties’ connection to Russia than with far 
left parties. However, some previous research briefly mentions that both far right and left 
parties can have common objectives with Russia, like undermining and dissolving the EU, 
based on their shared euroscepticism. Braghiroli and Makarychev (2016) provides the only 
article where both far right and left parties are considered showing similar objectives with 
Russia, although they are on the completely different sides of the political left-right spectrum. 
Their research will be supported by Klapsis (2015), an analysis by the Political Capital 
Institute (2014), Orenstein (2014) and Polyakova (2014), which all discuss the far right 
parties’ similarities to Russia.  
 
Braghiroli and Makarychev (2016) confirm that it is important for Russia to have allies 
within the EU, who can assist in setting Russia’s agenda. They have studied peripheral 
parties, which sympathize with Russia, in the European parliament. They come to the 
conclusion that these parties are more perceptible to Russian influence compared to 
mainstream parties. This is in line with the main assumption of this thesis. The following 
table describes four different ‘fears’ and ‘truths’ of Russia that the country expresses 
rhetorically and then concludes whether, and to what degree, the peripheral political parties 
agree with these. The fears are globalization, immigration and U.S. hegemony. The truths are 
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based on romanticizing the past days of the nation states. These truths and fear attract 
European peripheral political parties (Braghiroli & Makarychev 2016). 
  
 Conservatism  Sovereignty and 
National Interests 
Anti-U.S. Defeater of Fascism 
Far 
Right 
Largely consonant Consonant Consonant Divergent  
Far Left Radically divergent Controversial Consonant Consonant 
Table 2. Summary of the dimensions of Russia’s hegemonic discourse and its influence on far right 
and far left political parties (Braghiroli & Makarychev 2016:228) 
 
Previous literature captures that the cooperation between Russia and European peripheral 
political parties works because of mutual benefits. However, the Russian narrative is shaped 
in such a way that attracts political parties. Klapsis’ (2015) conclusion about the connection 
between Russia and far right political parties is that this is true. He claims that cooperation is 
formed on the basis of a common strategy as well as an ideological allure, which is 
accomplished through positive attention in media outlets like RT (Klapsis 2015). Braghiroli 
and Makarychev (2016) call this ‘trans-ideology’ and define it as “an attitude towards 
boosting political influence by pragmatically and intermittently breaching the boundaries of 
ideologies and political doctrines” (Braghiroli & Makarychev 2016:214). As captured in 
previous chapters, this is done by smart use of communications strategies.  
 
Russia uses different communication strategies in order to attract both the far right and left 
political parties and some examples will be given: 1. Russia’s anti-fascist agenda attracts the 
far left but not the far right. The far left associates Fascism and Nazism with modern racism, 
intolerance and xenophobia, which they strongly oppose. The Soviet Union’s anti-fascist 
agenda of the past and the experience of the Soviet Union defeating the Nazis during the 
Second World War gives this narrative credibility. 2. The far right agrees with Russia’s 
conservative values and dislikes EU’s liberal values like handing social rights to LGBT 
persons and striving to far from traditional and Christian values (Braghiroli & Makarychev 
2016; Klapsis 2015; Polyakova 2014). The far left political parties, on the other hand, oppose 
conservatism and the European United Left/Nordic Green left (GUE/NGL) group in the 
European Parliament has criticized Russia for its treatment of LGBT persons. 3. Russia’s 
devotion to national sovereignty and national interests is appealing to the European far right 
political parties. Parties like Front National (FN) have criticized the EU for pressuring the 
pro-Russian Ukrainian President Yanukovich to leave his seat, which is seen as interference 
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in states domestic affairs and an undermining of sovereignty. The far left is divided in this 
question (Braghiroli & Makarychev 2016). 
 
As the examples above show, ideologically, the far right and left are very different, but 
Russia manages maximize external political support because of skilful communication 
strategies, which are not affected by huge ideological differences. The common denominator 
between Russia and the peripheral political parties is, according to Braghiroli and 
Makarychev (2016), that they share an opposition against the liberal discourse of the EU as 
well as NATO. This captures that euroscepticism can be an explanation to why peripheral 
parties can show similar voting behaviour. Peripheral political parties, both to the far right 
and left, are criticizing the EU for letting the U.S. interfere in European politics and 
countries. As an example, Heinz-Christian Strache from the far right Freedom Party of 
Austria has criticized the EU for running the U.S. errands in Ukraine in order to oppose 
Russia. The far right is critical of EU’s supranational integration, which comes with liberal, 
multicultural and capitalist values. The far left tends to associate the EU and NATO with an 
American imperialistic agenda, which threatens global peace and security and undermines 
Europe’s relations with Russia. An expression of this was when the European Political Party 
‘Party of the European Left’ (EL) criticized the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), which they see as undermining the cooperation with Russia and China in 
order to strengthen further cooperation with the U.S. (Braghiroli & Makarychev 2016). The 
approach towards national sovereignty and European integration differs amongst the far left 
parties, according to Braghiroli and Makarychev (2016). Far left political parties opposing 
the EU and European integration often has its roots in thinking that the EU is ineffective and 
capitalistic. They are not against European cooperation per se, because they are not for 
nationalism based on ethnical grounds as the far right. However, they want to reform the EU. 
Certain political parties within GUE/NGL have opposed the economic sanctions against 
Russia, because of its negative effect on the Russian people. They have also claimed that the 
conflict in Ukraine could be a case of Western imperialism. The Communist Party of Greece 
(KKE) has criticized the EU for interfering in the referendum of Crimea. Some far left parties 
find Russia’s action less damaging than the influence of the EU and the U.S. (Braghiroli & 
Makarychev 2016).  
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This discussion shows that the connection between Russia and peripheral parties are not 
mainly based on shared ideology but shared Euroscepticism. This generates the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H1: The higher the degree of euroscepticism, the more likely is the peripheral party to vote in 
line with Russia’s interests.  
 
4.2 Euroscepticism and European peripheral parties  
 
As seen in the discussion above, the far right and the far left are eurosceptical for different 
reasons but eurosceptical nonetheless. Euroscepticism is defined as an opposition to the EU 
as a result of scepticism towards the process of European integration (Halikiopoulou et al. 
2012; Taggart 1998). According to Taggart (1998) there are different reasons for political 
parties to oppose the EU. First, a party is negative about the general idea of European 
integration and therefore opposes the EU and second, a party does not show negativity 
towards European integration but finds that the EU is not the right project to handle 
integration because it is too inclusive. The third option is that European integration is 
opposed because the project is to exclusive to achieve desirable European integration. Within 
the framework of euroscepticism, it is important to note that political parties can be 
eurosceptical to different extents (Elsas and Brug 2015: Taggart 1998).  
 
Scholars (e.g. Elsas and Brug 2015; Taggart 1998) agree that there is a clear correlation 
between ideology and euroscepticism. As ideologies are politically constructed, 
euroscepticism among certain party families can also change over time (Elsas & Brug 2015). 
As parties are governed by ideologies, they can be classified into different party families and 
this also applies to euroscepticism, according to Taggart (1998). Before, eurosceptical parties 
were often small, oppositional protest parties outside the government (Taggart 1998). These 
included mostly peripheral parties to the left and right. Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) 
claim, in line with the discussion above, that euroscepticism is a strategy for these parties, as 
they want to challenge current structures. Today, larger, mainstream parties are much more 
dependent on their support. Therefore, several eurosceptical parties in Europe have or are 
now part of a minority government. As a result of the different crises of the European Union 
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in the last couple of years, European politics have become more central in domestic politics 
(Taggart & Szczerbiak 2012).  
 
Scholars (e.g. Elsas & Brug 2015; Halikiopoulou et al. 2012; Taggart 1998) tend to agree that 
euroscepticism is most common in the periphery of the party system in Western Europe, 
where ideology can be defined on a left-right dimension. Social democratic, Christian 
democratic, conservative, agrarian and liberal are rarely associated with euroscepticism. This 
means that euroscepticism is most common in party families with far right and far left 
ideology, which Taggart (1998) calls the “new populist and extreme left”. As this relationship 
is politically constructed, it can change over time. According to Elsas and Brug (2015), 
euroscepticism used to be more common among far left and social democratic parties for 
socioeconomic reasons during the 1970s and 1980s. However, this has since changed since 
1992, when far right parties also started to show euroscepticism as a result of sociocultural 
reasons (Elsas & Brug 2015). This means that the relationship between euroscepticism and 
left-right ideology has changed from linear to a u-curve (van Elsas & van der Brug 2015).  
 
The far right and left party families are to be described as very ideologically different from 
each other but euroscepticism is a common denominator, which they share with each other 
and Russia. According to Taggart (1998), Halikiopoulou, Nanou and Vasilopoulou (2012) 
and Elsas and Brug (2015) this can be explained as the far right and far left party families 
having different reasons for why they are being eurosceptical, which also the discussion in 
the previous section showed. According to Elsas and Brug (2015) euroscepticism should be 
understood from a socioeconomic and sociocultural perspective.  
 
Far right euroscepticism arose after the Maastricht treaty was signed in 1992, which gave rise 
to the EU as it is today, and increased economic and political integration in Europe (Elsas & 
Brug 2015). Taggart (1998) explains that far right parties tend to be eurosceptical because 
they think that the EU is too inclusive. This is related to their concern with e.g. immigration 
(Halikiopoulou et al. 2012; Taggart 1998). Far right parties are not eurosceptical because of 
socioeconomic but for sociocultural reasons. This means that they do not oppose the 
economic liberal discourse of the EU, but they believe that the multicultural discourse of the 
EU threatens the nations cultural values.  
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Far left euroscepticism can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s, where not only far left 
parties, but also social democratic parties, showed euroscepticism (Elsas & Brug 2015). 
While far right parties tend to be eurosceptical because the EU is to too inclusive, far left 
parties think that the EU is too exclusive (Taggart 1998). This is  related to the far left often 
having an internationalist approach included in their left wing ideology (Halikiopoulou et al. 
2012). This means that far left parties are in favour of multiculturalism, but oppose European 
integration and the EU because of scepticism of its economic liberal discourse (Elsas & Brug 
2015) defined by capitalism and a free market economy. They believe it threatens the 
economic and social rights of the collective (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012) and the national 
welfare state (Elsas & Brug 2015).  
 
Elsas and van der Brug (2015) differs far right and left wing scepticism from each other by 
claiming that far left parties take on an ‘anti-liberal euroscepticism’ and far right parties a 
‘nationalism euroscepticism’. Halikiopoulou, Nanou and Vasilopoulou (2012) claim that 
nationalism, defined as the parties thinking that European integration is a “threat to the 
autonomy, unity and identity of the nation” (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012:506), is a common 
denominator among parties in the periphery (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012:506). However, these 
parties are nationalistic and eurosceptical for of different reasons. Far right parties tend to 
oppose immigration because it contests the national culture of the nation, which can be 
ethnical or because of linguistic values and characteristics. Even though the connection 
between nationalism and the left are usually seen as incompatible, Halikiopoulou, Nanou and 
Vasilopoulou (2012) claim that the far left party family tends to be nationalistic on civic 
grounds. While the far right wants to protect the nation, the far left wants to protect the 
popular classes against imperialism and the influence of great powers. Because of this they 
want the EU and NATO, which are seen as organizations promoting Western imperialism, to 
not interfere in states’ autonomy and right to national self-determination.  
 
The discussion above has shown that parties show signs of euroscepticism because of 
ideological reasons based on their views on socioeconomic and sociocultural reasons. Elsas 
and Brug (2015) and Halikiopoulou, Nanou and Vasilopoulou (2012) also suggest that parties 
in the periphery tend to show euroscepticism for strategic reasons, which are that they want 
to differ themselves from other mainstream parties. Therefore, they oppose European 
integration and the EU (Elsas & Brug 2015; Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). 
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5 Methodology and data  
This study has the ambition to increase the understanding of why peripheral European 
political parties vote the way they do in votes regarding Russia and/or Russia’s interests and 
objectives in the European Parliament. This knowledge will increase the understanding of 
which potential influence Russia can have on these political parties. The hypothesis 
presented, in line with the theory, is that the higher degree of euroscepticism the more likely 
is the peripheral party to vote in line with Russia’s interests. This indicates that there is a 
positive correlation between euroscepticism and the way peripheral parties vote regarding 
these issues, which makes this study an explanatory, theory-testing study. These cases, 
European peripheral parties, are interesting to try to understand as one and the same 
population, as they ideologically are fundamentally different from each other but share 
euroscepticism as a common denominator – as they also do with Russia.  
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multivariate regressions will be conducted in order to be able 
to see if there is a linear causal relationship between the peripheral parties degree of 
euroscepticism and their voting behaviour. Five control variables will be introduced, which 
will generate a total of six regression models.  
 
Cross-sectional (CS) data will be used in the OLS multivariate regression analysis, which 
means that the population – peripheral parties – will be studied at a specific point of time. 
How the parties voted, will be an aggregated value distinguished from when the eighth 
European parliament assumed office on 1 July 2014 throughout the whole year of 2015. One 
and a half years have been used in order to get enough data (resolutions – see below) for it to 
measure what it is intended to measure i.e. how peripheral political parties vote in votes 
regarding Russia and Russia’s interests. To few observations would not assure that. The rest 
of the data, except for if the party held a government position in 2014 and/or 2015, will be 
taken from data measured in 2014, but this should not be considered an issue as the parties 
will not have been able to change their policy positions in that short of a time. These years 
are considered interesting as these followed the annexation of Crimea, which changed the 
political climate in Europe.   
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Using cross-sectional data is considered the only option in this newly developed academic 
field and as the effect of euroscepticism on peripheral political parties has never been tested 
quantitatively before. Russia is not known to have used soft power influence on political 
parties until a few years ago, so a time-series (TS) or time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) 
study would not be appropriate. A TSCS study is a favourable option to rule out reverse 
causality, however, this is not theoretically likely as voting behaviour should not be able to 
effect euroscepticism.   
 
5.1 Case selection and sampling  
 
A large-N study is to be conducted, where N should reach at least the number of 30 for the 
purpose of insuring statistical power. It is often occurring that peripheral parties are studied 
within Western Europe (often defined as EU-15), because of similar party systems, values 
and historical experiences. This has been considered for this thesis but due to the lack of 
Western European peripheral parties and data, it has not been possible to reach a sample size 
30 cases (N=30) only looking at parties in Western Europe. Therefore the peripheral parties 
from all the 28 EU member states have been picked, as long as they are considered far right 
or far left and have a seat in parliament. The parties from the following countries are 
represented in this study: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
 
It has not only been a practical necessity to include all peripheral parties in the EU, but 
including all European peripheral parties partly generates good opportunities to generalize 
(Esaiasson et al. 2012:171) the results to a whole population - peripheral political parties - in 
a defined geographical area – Europe/the EU. Partly, it has also been a practical necessity in 
order to reach a sample of 30. However, it can prove challenging to choose which parties that 
are considered peripheral parties, or more precisely, far right and left parties (see Mudde 
2007). Therefore, this decision-making process has to be explained.  As pointed out in the 
introduction by Mudde (2007), the term ‘far’ is only an umbrella term for the democratic 
‘radical’ right and left and the ‘extreme’, anti-democratic, right and left. Partly because of the 
importance of getting a large enough sample, parties from both these categories have had to 
be included. As none of these parties share the exact same ideological traits, this thesis will 
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work with the concept of “family resemblance”, which was introduced by the Austrian-
British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein and is used by Mudde (2007). This concept is based 
on the idea that they at least share one ideological trait with the rest of the party family. This 
cannot only be euroscepticism, as this trait on its own would not make the parties peripheral.  
 
To a large extent, the peripheral parties have been chosen on the basis of which party family 
they belong to and McElroy and Benoit’s (2011) framework on left-right party positioning in 
the EP has helped with this decision. The European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
(GUE/NGL) is furthest to the left and this group includes all far left political parties except 
for the Socialist People’s Party (SF), which belong to the Greens-European Free Alliance 
(Greens/EFA). SF was included on the basis of that it shares an historical connection to 
communism, which most political parties do in GUE/NGL and because it belongs to the 
political alliance (Nordic Green Left Alliance), together with e.g. Sweden’s Left Party (V) 
and Finland’s Left Alliance (VAS). Some far left belong to the Non-Instricts (NI), which 
means that they do not hold a position in one of the recognized political groups in the EP. 
The National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), some MEPs of FN, Golden Dawn (XA) 
and Jobbik belong to this category and are all included in the sample because, as already 
mentioned, they are considered far right parties connected to Russia (Political Policy 
Research and Consulting Institute 2014). The Communist Party of Greece (KKE), which as 
an openly communist party (Communist Party of Greece 2016), is also a NI and is included 
in the sample.  
 
The far right political parties have been more disunited. If they are not NI, they usually 
belong to one of three political groups in the EP: Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF), 
which FPÖ, VB, Northern League (LN), the majority of the MEPs in FN, one of the MEPs in 
AfD and Party for Freedom (PVV) belong to; Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFFD), 
which Sweden Democrats (SD), UKIP, Lithuania’s Order and Justice (TT) and one MEP of 
AfD belong to; European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which Danish People’s Party 
(DF), Finns Party (PS) and Latvia’s National Alliance (NA). According to McElroy and 
Benoit’s (2011) study, the ECR and EFFD belong to the far right of the political spectrum. 
Since their study was conducted, the ENF has formed and would be considered further to the 
right than the ECR and EFFD.  
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It is important to note that some parties, like the far left parties Italy’s ‘The Other Europe 
with Tsipras’ and United Kingdom’s Sinn Féin, have been excluded due to the lack of data. 
Eurosceptic factions (see Taggart & Szczerbiak 2008) within parties will not be included.  
 
5.2 Variables and data 
5.2.1 Dependent variable: Voting behaviour  
It is important to note that how peripheral parties vote can be an expression of them 
sympathizing with Russia. However, this is not what is measured in this analysis and 
therefore it is only possible to claim that these parties might be or become influenced by 
Russia because they might have same strategic interests: euroscepticism. The dependent 
variable measures the voting behaviour among peripheral political parties in the European 
parliament in votes regarding Russia and/or Russia’s interest and objectives in the European 
parliament. 
 
Using the Manifesto Project Dataset (Volkens et al. 2014) was considered as it includes two 
variables that express negative or positive sentiments towards Russia. The Manifesto Project 
produces quantitative data on parties’ policy positions by conducting content analyses on 
parties’ electoral manifestos. This would have expressed the peripheral parties sympathises 
towards Russia in a more straightforward manner. However, this proved to be difficult, as the 
data did not show any sympathies in any direction. This is not surprising, as manifestos tend 
to show the party positions, which the political parties themselves have produced and want to 
show. As the Political Policy Research and Consulting Institute (2014) discusses, not all 
parties are openly supporting Russia but might be showing sympathies in practice, as in the 
example with the PVV.  
 
The dependent variable has been based on resolutions that have been voted on and accepted 
in the European parliament from when the eighth European Parliament had its first meeting 
on 1 July 2014 until 31 December 2015. The fifteen resolutions have been picked based on 
four criterions (which are motivated in appendix 2):  
 
1. They encourage further cooperation with and integration of Moldova, Ukraine and 
Georgia, which all belong to Russia’s sphere of influence.  
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2. They regard energy security and want to decrease the EU member states or Moldova, 
Ukraine and Georgia’s dependence on Russian energy. 
3. They welcome the economic sanctions against Russia and/or Crimea, which began to 
be applied from March 2014.  
4. They criticize Russia and/or Russia’s actions in Ukraine.     
 
Again, the resolutions selected have been accepted by a simple majority (Rules of Procedure: 
(8th parliament turn 2014) of the MEPs in the European Parliament. When the selected 
peripheral parties have voted against a resolution, i.e. in line with Russia’s interests, they 
receive one point (see annex 1). Added together, this gives the dependent variable, 
vote_comb, and a maximum value of 15. A party that vote against Russia’s interests in a 
resolution instead gets -1, but can only get the least the value 0. To summarize, the dependent 
variable, vote_comb, can get a value of 0-15 where 0 captures that the party votes against 
Russia’s interests to a very high degree and 15 captures that a party votes in line with 
Russia’s interests to a very high degree. In this way of establishing the dependent variable, 
abstaining from voting or not participating in the vote is not considered important. Abstaining 
from voting might be considered a statement in itself, however, this will be overlooked at is 
impossible to draw any conclusions from the parties choosing to abstain with a quantitative 
method.   
 
As can be seen in the histogram of the dependent variable, vote_comb, presented in 
Appendix 3, the variable is slightly right skewed, which might affect the analysis. However, 
normal distribution is assumed as the variable is only slightly skewed.   
 
5.2.2 Independent variable: Euroscepticism   
As described, euroscepticism is defined as an opposition to the EU as a result of scepticism 
towards the process of European integration. This theoretical concept will be operationalized, 
with the variable eu_position from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015). 
The Manifesto Project Dataset also provides information on European political parties’ 
stances towards political ideology, European integration and party positions. However, the 
Chapel Hill expert survey shows advantages in comparison to the Manifesto Project, as they 
include 337 political party experts’ opinions party positioning (Bakker et al. 2015). When 
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only looking at manifestos, important nuances will get lost, as what the parties officially say 
in their manifestos might not reflect their true nature. The same applies for the Euromanifesto 
Project’s Manifesto or Party Elite studies, which have never been options as they are not yet 
available for the 2014-2019 period. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey variable eu_position 
aligns with the theoretical concepts as it measures “overall orientation of the party leadership 
towards European integration in 2014” (Bakker et al. 2015:12). Previous research has 
captured that euroscepticsm can be related to anti U.S. sentiments. However, this variable 
cannot be found in any datasets containing information on European parties’ political 
positions and could therefore not be controlled for. This variable would have been a good 
control to test the relationship between euroscepticism and voting behaviour.  
 
Previously, it has been claimed, in line with the hypothesis, that the higher the degree of 
euroscepticism the more likely is the peripheral party to vote in line with Russia’s interests. 
This still applies, however, the way the variable eu_position is coded in the Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey dataset will show a negative relationship if the hypothesis is accepted. The 
variable is coded from 1 to 7, where 1 shows that the party strongly opposes European 
integration, 4 is neutral and 7, is strongly in favour of European integration. The coding will 
generate a variable which informs about the absence of scepticism towards European 
integration. After running the descriptive statistics and checking for normal distribution, the 
independent variable, eu_position, turns out to be right skewed and is therefore log-
transformed. The variable is called ln_eu_position throughout the regression analysis.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The independent variable euroscepticism before and after log-transformation. 
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5.2.3 Control variables 
5.2.3.1 Nationalism 
Halikiopoulou, Nanou and Vasilopoulou (2012) claim that both the far right and left 
euroscepticism can be explained by nationalism. The far right oppose European integration 
because of nationalism and the far left, which is associated with internationalism, oppose 
European integration because it is a neoliberal project. Halikiopoulou, Nanou and 
Vasilopoulou (2012) find that peripheral parties to the right and left are nationalist on 
territorial grounds but only far right parties give this an ethnical context. It is interesting to 
note that the Irish far left party Sinn Féin has a strong nationalistic agenda. Halikiopoulou, 
Nanou and Vasilopoulou (2012) also find that the higher the level of nationalism, the higher 
the level of euroscepticism. Already in this stage, a multicollinearity problem can be 
suspected, which will have to be tested in the preliminary analysis. 
 
The variable nationalism from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey will measure nationalism. 
It is measures from 0 to 10, where 0 means that the party prefers a cosmopolitan approach to 
society and 10 means that the party strongly prefers nationalism (Bakker et al. 2015:17). 
Cosmopolitanism reflects inclusiveness while nationalism reflects exclusiveness 
(Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). Choosing this dataset before others has the same advantages as 
with the variable chosen to measure euroscepticism. It is normally distributed, which can be 
seen in appendix 3, and is therefore not log-transformed.  
 
5.2.3.2 Eastern Orthodox 
The second variable that will be controlled for is Eastern Orthodoxy. Russia is a country 
where the Eastern Orthodox Church has a dominant influence. According to Biersack and 
O’Lear (2014) and Braghiroli and Makarychev (2016), Russia tries to use this common 
cultural and historical similarity in order to use soft power to influence Eastern Orthodox 
countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Greece to become more sensitive to Russia’s interests.  
McIntosh (2015) says that Russian media especially highlights that liberal Europe actively 
promotes gay marriage for Eastern Orthodox audiences. This is therefore controlled for as a 
dummy variable. The data is not based on an already existing dataset, but has been put 
together manually based on the Pew Research Center’s Global Christianity report (2011:31, 
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83). In the sample, Greece (88,3 %) and Cyprus (78 %) have an overwhelming majority of 
people who are Eastern Orthodox. All parties who have their base in these countries – XA, 
SYRIZA, KKE and the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) – will therefore get the 
value 1. The rest of the parties will be allocated value 0.  
The variable is named east_orth and is a nominal variable. It has not been log-transformed, as 
there are no dummies that are normally distributed, due to fact that dummies can only possess 
two values – 0 or 1.  
 
5.2.3.3 Historical ties 
This control variable will also be a manually put together dummy, where the value 1 captures 
that the party is from a country, which has either been a part of the Soviet Union, like Latvia 
and Lithuania, or a satellite state of the Soviet Union, like Poland, Czech Republic (as 
Czechoslovakia), Hungary and Germany (as East Germany i.e. the German Democratic 
Republic, DDR). This will be used as a control variable as these countries tend to have 
negative historical experiences of being coerced, dominated and in conflict with the Soviet 
Union, which today is Russia. One can assume that these countries are less likely to vote in 
line with Russia’s interests and vote against anything that would undermine European 
institutions. Finland is mentioned as having negative historical experiences with Russia 
because of the Winter War in World War II (Laruelle 2015), but has in this study been 
assigned a value of 0, i.e. no historical experiences. This is done because one has to draw a 
line somewhere. With regards to the criteria set, the parties AfD, NPD, Latvia’s National 
Alliance (NA), Lithuania’s Order and Justice (TT), Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia (KSCM) and Die Linke.  
 
The dummy is called hist_ties and as this is a dummy, it has not been log-transformed.  
 
5.2.3.4 Government position  
“Euroscepticism has come in from the cold” (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2013:34), as Taggart and 
Szczerbiak (2013) claim. The fourth control variable is called govern and reflects whether the 
party is in a government position or not. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2013) come to the 
conclusion that eurosceptical parties, which most likely are found in the periphery parts of the 
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political spectrum, become more moderate in their euroscepticism when in a government 
position. If this is assumed to be the case, there will be less of an interest in voting in line 
with Russia’s interests in the EP. The variable govern is a dummy. A party gets the value 1 if 
they held a position in their national government in 2014 and/or 2015 and 0 if they did not. 
The Finns Party (PS), NA, TT, SYRIZA and Sinn Féin got the value 1, as they all held 
government position in 2014 and/or 2015, which are the years the votes on the resolutions in 
the EP were studied. As this variable is a dummy, it was not log-transformed.  
 
5.2.3.5 Anti-establishment   
Being anti-establishment is often related to the concept of populism, which means critical 
towards the political establishment and the political elites (Rydgren 2005:413). Populism is 
common among European far right parties, but far left populism also exists (Mudde 2007). 
Previous research has suggested that peripheral parties are sceptical towards the European 
establishment and the elites working for the EU institutions and this should therefore be 
tested for. The variable nationalism from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey will measure 
anti-establishment and this dataset has the same advantages as with the variables for 
euroscepticism and nationalism. The variable measures “salience of anti-establishment and 
anti-elite rhetoric” (Bakker et al. 2015:17), where 0 means sees no importance at all and 10 
means that the party finds it extremely important.  As the variable antielite_salience is close 
to normally distributed (see appendix 3), it is therefore not logtransformed. \  
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6 Results  
This section will present the results of the OLS multivariate regressions to see if there is a 
linear relationship between European peripheral parties’ degree of euroscepticism 
(ln_eu_position) and these parties’ voting behaviour (vote_comb) - measured as to what 
degree they vote in line with Russia’s interests. This is labled ‘votes’ throughout the whole 
analysis, but reflects voting behaviour. A positive relationship is to be expected, in line with 
the hypothesis, but because of the way the variable ln_eu_position is coded, a negative 
relationship is to be expected from the regression models.  
 
The results section will first start of by presenting the preliminary statistics. This includes a 
table with descriptive statistics that describes the variables, the correlation between the 
dependent variable and the independent variable, as well as with the interval control variables 
nationalism and anti-salience. This will detect multicollinearity, but a Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) test, where the dummy control variables east_orth, govern and hist_ties will be 
included to further test for multicollinearity. The preliminary statistics sub-section will finish 
off with a test for heteroscedacity.  
 
In the following sub-section, the regressions – bi- and multivariate – will be ran, which 
generates six models containing the dependent and the independent variable as well as the 
give control variables.   
 
6.1 Preliminary statistics   
The following table describes the variables that will be used in the regression models. For all 
variables except one, ln_eu_position, the peripheral party holds more of the trait the higher 
the value. Also note that ln_eu_position has been log-transformed, thus show different values 
in the table than those described in the theory section.  
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Variable Description of variable N Min Max Mean SD 
DV: Votes 
(vote_comb) 
Interval: Degree to which the 
party votes in line with 
Russia’s interests 
31 0 14 7.06 4.99 
IV: Euroscepticism 
(ln_eu_position) 
Interval: Degree of absence of 
scepticism towards European 
integration 
31 0.09 1.74 0.80 0.51 
C1: Nationalism 
(nationalism) 
Interval: Degree of nationalism 31 1.28 10 6.78 2.99 
C2: Eastern 
Orthodox 
(east_orth) 
Dummy (nominal): If the party 
is from a country that is 
predominantly Eastern 
Orthodox 
31 0 1 .13 .341 
C3: In government 
(govern) 
Dummy (nominal): If the party 
holds a government position 
31 0 1 .16 .374 
C4: Historical ties 
(hist_ties) 
Dummy (nominal): If the 
country has been a satellite 
state to or been a part of the 
Soviet Union  
31 0 1 .19 .402 
C5: Anti-
establishment 
(antielite_salience) 
Interval: Degree of anti-
establishment and anti-elite 
rhetoric  
31 2.90 10 7.62 1.93 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics  
 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r) is used to establish if there is a 
bivariate correlation between the dependent variable, votes_comb, and the independent 
variable, ln_eu_position and between the control variables. This measurement is used when 
exploring the correlation between interval variables. It measures the linear association as well 
as the direction of the association between the independent and dependent variable. The value 
of -1 indicates a perfect linear negative association, while +1 indicates a perfect linear 
positive association, but this rarely occurs. If the value would be 0, no linear correlation can 
be traced (Esaiasson et al. 2012:366). The scatterplot below shows the correlation. The linear 
regression line shows how a perfect correlation would look like, which captures that this is 
not a perfect linear relationship although most peripheral parties position themselves around 
this line. Several outliers are shown: PS, DF, V, TT, VAS, SF and NA. The correlation 
coefficient -.541 shows that there is a significant (0,01 % significance level), negative 
correlation between euroscepticism and peripheral parties’ voting behaviour in votes 
regarding Russia’s interests, which is in line the hypothesis. The number is not very close to -
1, which would indicate a perfect negative correlation. The correlation is significant 
correlation between votes and euroscepticism at a 0.01 level. The correlation coefficient is 
displayed in the table below.  
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Figure 2. Scatter plot showing the correlation between euroscepticism and voting behaviour.  
 
When introducing the control variables, it is important to take into account that three control 
variables are nominal variables. Pearson’s r is not a suitable measurement for nominal 
variables. As explained previously, it is theoretically possible that a peripheral, eurosceptical 
party also show anti-establishment and nationalistic sentiments. It is therefore important to 
check for multicollinearity among the independent and control variables. If these show to co-
vary too much, it will be difficult to distinguish which variable affects the dependent 
variable. Pearson’s r has been used to measure the correlation between the interval variables. 
It is assumed that correlations above .80 are problematic, but as can be in the table below, no 
values are above .80. Therefore, multicollinearity is not assumed.  
 
 vote_comb ln_eu_position nationalism antielite_salience 
vote_comb 1.000    
ln_eu_position -.541 1.00   
nationalism .174 -.543 1.00  
antielite_salience -.548 -.626 .434 1.00 
Table 4. Correlations matrix and a first test for multicollinearity.  
 
To be on the safe side, a second test for multicollinearity is conducted, looking at the VIF and 
here the dummy variables are included. Field (2009:325) claim that VIF values higher than 5, 
  39 
which gives a tolerance value of 0,2, are clear signs of multicollinearity. As can be seen in 
the table below, no VIF values are close to exceeding 5 and multicollinearity is assumed not 
to be an issue.  
 
 Tolerance VIF 
ln_eu_position .527 1.899 
nationalism .837 1.195 
east_orth .844 1.185 
govern .727 1.375 
hist_ties .522 1.915 
antielite_salience .398 2.510 
Table 5. Second test for multicollinearity, looking at VIF and tolerance levels. 
  
As could be see in the scatter plot of the bivariate correlation above, there are outliers, which 
potentially can generate heteroscedacity. One important assumption when conducting an OLS 
regression specifically is that the errors are constant. This is called homoscedacity. If not, the 
standard errors for the coefficients will get higher or lower values than they should be, which 
will effect the significance levels. To test for heteroscedacity, a visualization approach is used 
to se that the. As can be seen in the scatterplot below, no specific shape, e.g. in the shape of a 
megaphone or hourglass, can be traced which means that the model works as well throughout 
the whole model. Homoscedacity is assumed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The scatter plot shows a visualization of homoscedacity.  
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Finally, extreme outliers have been looked for the interval variables vote_comb, 
ln_eu_position (which has been log-transformed and should therefore not show outliers), 
nationalism and antielite_salience. No extreme outliers have been found and will not be taken 
into consideration. The box-and-whiskers plots are presented in Appendix 3. As the dummies 
only show two values, 0 for no and 1 for yes, there are always extremities. Therefore, these 
are not examined for extreme outliers.  
 
6.2 Regression models   
The regressions are initiated by conducting a bivariate regression analysis, which will test the 
hypothesis that the higher the degree of euroscepticism, the more likely is the peripheral party 
to vote in line with Russia’s interest. The bivariate regression constitutes model 1 in the table 
below.  
 
DV: votes_comb Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
IV: ln_eu_position -5.288** 
(1.528) 
 
-6.186** 
(1.825) 
-5.698** 
(1,787) 
-3.668 
(1.847) 
-3.675 
(1.903) 
-1.388 
(2.051) 
C1: nationalism  -.283 
(.312) 
-.165 
(.309) 
.122 
(.309) 
.120 
(.324) 
.018 
(.305) 
C2: east_orth   3.908 
(2.279) 
4.973* 
(2.144) 
4.983* 
(2.211) 
3.851 
(2.120) 
C3: govern    -5.131* 
(2.121) 
-5.140* 
(2.187) 
-6.018** 
(2.073) 
C4: hist_ties     0.51 
(1.916) 
.444 
(1.792) 
C5: 
antielite_salience 
     1.047* 
(.474) 
       
Constant 11.270*** 
(1.437) 
13.902*** 
(3.241) 
12.210*** 
(3.286) 
9.340** 
(3.250) 
9.350** 
(3.350) 
.459 
(5.080) 
Adjusted R2 .268 .263 .311 .416 .393 .474 
N 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Table 6. Regression models. *p<0.05** p<0.01***p<0.001. Standard Errors in parentheses.  
 
After running the bivariate regression, model 1 supports the hypotheses that the higher the 
degree of euroscepticism, the more likely is the peripheral party to vote in line with Russia’s 
interest and this causality is significant to a 0,01 % significance level. The relationship is 
negative, which was to be expected because of the variable ln_eu_position’s coding, where 
the lower the value the more eurosceptical the peripheral party is. The number -5.288 
  41 
indicates that an increase in one of the independent variable, leads to a decrease in 
approximately 5 in the dependent variable. This captures that the party is less likely to vote in 
line with Russia’s interests the less eurosceptical it is.     
 
The adjusted R2 explains the variance between 0 and 1, where the higher the number the 
better. The adjusted R2 has been chosen before R2, as it takes into account the amount of 
independent and control variables included, which makes it a more cautious measurement. 
The number presented explains how the variance in the independent variable explains the 
variance in the dependent variable. In model 1 this indicates that 26,8 % of the variance in the 
dependent variable, vote_comb, can be explained by the independent variable, 
ln_eu_position.  
 
In the following models 2-6, the control variables are included one by one, which makes it a 
multivariate regression analysis. Model 2 shows the effect of ln_eu_position on votes_comb 
under control for nationalism. When introducing this variable nationalism, the relationship 
between independent and the dependent variable remains negative and significant on a 0,01 
% significance level. The negative effect of nationalism has on voting behaviour is not 
significant.  
 
Model 3 introduces the dummy east_orth, which captures whether the party is from a country 
that is Eastern Orthodox. Dummies can be used in regression analysis, as they can be seen as 
interval variables as the steps are constant in length. The relationship between euroscepticism 
and voting behaviour still remains negative and significant. The variable east_orth has a 
positive, yet insignificant, effect on votes_comb.  
 
Model 4 introduces the control dummy govern. It can be seen in the table that euroscepticism 
no longer has a significant effect on voting behaviour when the variable govern, which means 
that parties hold a government position, is introduced. Although, the control variable govern 
and east_orth show a significant relationship with the dependent variable, negative and 
positive respectively, to a 0,05 % significance level.   
 
In model 5, the variable hist_ties is introduced, which captures whether the peripheral parties 
are from countries that used to belong to or be a satellite state of the Soviet Union. However, 
the negative effect of euroscepticism on voting behaviour remains insignificant.  
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Model 6, when introducing the control variable antielite_salience, captures an important 
change. First, the value of the b coefficient, which had been fairly steady since model 4, 
decreases from a value of -3.675 to -1.388, which means that an increase in 1 in the 
independent variable makes the dependent variable decrease 1.388. However, this 
relationship was proven not to be significant. Under control for antielite_salience, the 
relationship between the variable govern and votes_comb becomes more significant and 
increases in significance level from 0,05 % to 0,01 %. The b coefficient also increases in 
comparison to in model 4 and 5. The relationship between antielite_salience and votes_comb 
is significant to a 0,05 % significance level. After introducing all control variables, the 
variance in euroscepticism cannot explain the variance the peripheral parties’ voting 
behaviour. This indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, anti-
establishment sentiments and government position can act as predictors. Note that the 
constant becomes insignificant and decreases to .459 in model 6. This remains when only 
running a bivariate regression with the dependent variable vote_comb and antielite_salience. 
This is interpreted as the constant not being significantly far from origo, i.e. a value of 0, 
which means that votes_comb simultaneously also is close to a value of 0. This does not 
weaken the model as the constant does not affect how the other independent and control 
variables are to be interpreted.  
 
As a concluding remark, some variables do not have a significant effect on voting behaviour, 
but when looking at the ANOVA and the model summary, after having introduced all 
variables (attached in appendix 3), all models fit well together. The linear multivariate 
regression account for 47,4 % of the variance in the dependent variable to a significance level 
of 0,001 %.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  43 
7 Concluding discussion  
The aim of this thesis was to be able the answer research question: What effect does the 
degree of euroscepticism have on the voting behaviour of peripheral parties in votes in the 
European parliament, which, directly or indirectly, regards Russia and Russia’s interests and 
objectives? This was argued to be important in order to understand the potential influence 
Russia can have on these parties, which can affect EU policy making. Euroscepticism was 
argued to be the common denominator that Russia and peripheral parties to both the right and 
left of the political spectrum shared, which results in a common strategy to undermine the EU 
and hinder further European integration. 
 
The theoretical discussion generated the following hypothesis, which was believed to answer 
the research question:  
 
H1: The higher the degree of euroscepticism, the more likely is the peripheral party to vote in 
line with Russia’s interests.  
 
This hypothesis reflected a positive casual relationship between the variable euroscepticism 
and peripheral parties’ voting behaviour, although it would be presented in the regression 
models as negative because of coding of the variable euroscepticism. The regression analysis 
presented six models. Throughout model 1 to 3, when not only the independent and 
dependent variables euroscepticism and voting behaviour had been introduced, but also the 
control variables nationalism and Eastern Orthodoxy, there seemed to be a negative causal 
relationship between the the degree of absence of scepticism towards European integration 
and the degree to which the parties vote in line with Russia’s interests. This was in line with 
the hypothesis and expected, however, this changed throughout model 4 to 6 when the 
variables government position, historical ties and anti-establishment were introduced. The 
effect of euroscepticism on voting behaviour decreased and became insignificant.  
 
In the sixth and final model, when all variables had been included, only two variables could 
individually be claimed to have an significant effect on voting behaviour, namely the fact that 
the peripheral party holds a government position and the parties’ degree of anti-establishment 
sentiments. The variable government position showed a negative effect on the dependent 
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variable, which indicates that if the party holds a government position, it is less likely to vote 
in line with Russia’s interests. As could be seen in the scatterplot capturing the correlation 
between euroscepticism and voting behaviour, there were several outliers that showed no 
signs of voting in line with Russia’s interests. Many of these parties held a government 
position e.g. the Finns Party in Finland, Order and Justice in Lithuania and National Alliance 
in Latvia. This relationship has to be theorised further in future research, but this might be an 
indication of that parties in government do not feel the need to contest the European 
structures and institutions to the same degree and therefore declines to vote in line with 
Russia’s interests. This in accordance with Hooghe, Marks and Wilson’s (2002) discussion. 
 
The degree of anti-establishment sentiments was showed to be a significant predictor of 
voting behaviour in votes regarding Russia’s interests. This relationship should also be 
examined further in future research but it is an interesting finding that anti-establishment 
generates a significant relationship with voting behaviour, while euroscepticism does not. 
Although, one can argue that this is not surprising. If a party is eurosceptical, it is most likely 
also against the European political establishment. Braghiroli and Makarychev (2016) 
mentioned briefly that Russia is sometimes regarded as a better option, especially among the 
far left parties, when the only other option is the EU, NATO and the U.S. This could explain 
the voting behaviour and can still open up for Russia influencing these parties with soft 
Russian power. Therefore, this is an important finding. Far right political parties are most 
often associated with populism, but as far left parties also tended to vote in line with Russia’s 
interests and against the mainstream parties, this might be an indication that this can also be a 
common denominator that deserves looking further into.  
 
To make some concluding remarks on this study, it has been one of a kind as this is the first 
time a quantitative study has been conducted on this topic. Peripheral parties to the right and 
left have only been studied to a limited extent with regards to their sensitivety to Russian 
interests. The regressions were conducted and the model fitted well, which is an important 
finding in itself. However, as this is a new phenomenon, more qualitative studies should be 
done parallel to quantitative ones. For example, outliers were seen in the correlation scatter 
plot and the majority of these parties were from the Baltic Sea region and did not at all vote 
in line with Russia’s interests. To try to explain this qualitatively would make the puzzle 
more complete, as only the well known parties like National Front (FN), Jobbik and Golden 
Dawn (XA) have been studied in depth before. If further quantitative studies were to be 
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conducted in the future, it would have been interesting to do a time-series-cross-sectional 
(TSCS) study to see if the voting behaviour has changed before versus after Ukraine or even 
before the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, which Polykova states (2014). The study conducted in 
this thesis can also be done again but with a different dataset and with anti U.S. sentiments as 
a variable. How these peripheral parties might act as Russian proxies on a national level, 
would also generate important knowledge.  
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Appendix 1.   
 
  EP  
political 
group 
2009 EP 
election results 
2014 EP 
election 
results 
Austria Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) ENF 12.71 % (2) 19.72% (4) 
Belgium Flemish Interest (VB) ENF 9.85 % (2) 4.26 % (1) 
Cyprus Progressive Party of Working People 
(AKEL) 
GUE/NGL 34.9 % (2) 26.98 % (2) 
Czech 
Republic 
Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia (KSCM) 
GUE/NGL 14.18 % (4) 10.98 % (3) 
Denmark Danish People's Party (DF) ECR 14.8 % (2) 26.60 % (4) 
Denmark Socialist People's Party (SF) Greens/EFA 15.4 % (2) 11.1 % (1) 
Finland Finns Party (PS) ECR 9.79 % (1) 12.9 % (2) 
Finland Left Alliance (VAS) GUE/NGL 5.9 % (0) 9.3 (1) 
France National Front (FN) ENF/NI 6.3 % (3) 24.86 % (23) 
France Unitary Coalition/French Communist 
Party (CDU/PCF) 
GUE/NGL  
6.48% (5) as 
Left Front (PG) 
 
6.33 % (3) as 
PG France Left Party (PG) GUE/NGL 
Germany Alternative for Germany (AfD) ENF/EFDD - 7.10 % (7) 
Germany National Democratic Party of 
Germany (NPD) 
NI - 1 % (1) 
Germany Die Linke  GUE/NGL 7.5 % (8) 7.47 % (7) 
Greece Golden Dawn (XA) NI . 9.39 % (3) 
Greece Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) GUE/NGL 4.7 % (1) 26.57 % (6) 
Greece Communist Party of Greece (KKE) NI 8.35 % (2) 6.11 % (2) 
Hungary Jobbik, the Movement for a Better 
Hungary (Jobbik) 
NI 14.77 % (3) 14.67 % (3) 
Italy North League (LN) ENF 10.2 % (9) 6.15 % (5) 
Ireland Sinn Féin GUE/NGL 11.24 % (0) 19.52 % (3) 
Latvia National Alliance "All For Latvia!" - 
"For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK" 
(NA) 
ECR . 7.45 % (1) 
Lithuania Order and Justice (TT) EFDD 12.22 % (2) 14.25 % (2) 
Netherlands Party for Freedom (PVV) ENF 16.97 % (4) 13.32 % (4) 
Netherlands Socialist Party (SP) GUE/NGL 7.1 % (2) 9.6 % (2) 
Portugal Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) GUE/NGL 10.64 % (2) 13.71 % (3) 
Portugal Left Bloc (BE) GUE/NGL 10.73 % (3) 4.93 % (1) 
Spain United Left (IU) GUE/NGL 3.73 % (1) as a 
coalition 
10.03 % (5) 
Spain Podemos  GUE/NGL . 7.98 % (5) 
Sweden Sweden Democracts (SD) EFDD 3.27 % (0) 9.67 % (2) 
Sweden Left Party (V) GUE/NGL 5.66 % (1) 6.3 % (1) 
United 
Kingdom 
UK Independence Party (UKIP) EFDD 16.09 % (13) 26.77 % (27) 
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Appendix 2.  
 
 
Resolutions/Procedures Criteria Examples 
1. 2015/2838(RSP)  
 
Russia, in Particular 
the Cases of Eston 
Kohver, Oleg Sentsov 
and Olexandr 
Kolchenko 
European 
integration 
 
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
 
Economic 
sanction 
 
Criticism 
Russia 
Strongly condems the non-fair trial of Estonian 
police officer Eston Kohver and the illegal 
sentencing of Oleg Sentsov and Olexandr 
Kolchenko. In Russia law and justice are being 
used as political instruments in breach of 
international law and standards. Strongly condems 
the violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine 
and Estonia.  
2. 2015/2036(INI)  
 
Strategic Military 
Situation in the Black 
Sea Basin following the 
illegal annexation of 
Crimea 
European 
integration 
Providing Ukraine with defensive arms should be 
considered as well as the support to Ukraine in 
enhancing defence capabilities. 
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
 
Economic 
sanction 
The sanctions regime should against Russia should 
be continued and strengthened if Russia does not 
fully implement the Minsk ceasefire agreement.  
Criticism 
Russia 
Firmly support the non-recognition of Russia's 
annexation of Crimea. Condemns the fact that 
Russia is providing direct and indirect support to 
the separatists groups in Ukraine, including in the 
form of weapons and recruitment and is concerned 
by reports of war crime.  
3. 2015/2001(INI)  
 
Report on the State of 
EU-Russia relations 
European 
integration 
 
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
Firmly supports the swift creation of a European 
Energy Union in order to reduce considerably the 
dependence of individual Member States on 
external energy suppliers, particulary Russia.  
Economic 
sanction 
 
Criticism 
Russia 
Is deeply concerned by the restrictions on media 
and internet freedom.  
4. 2015/2592(RSP)  European  
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Murder of Russian 
Opposition Leader 
Boris Nemtsov and the 
State of Democracy in 
Russia 
integration 
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
 
Economic 
sanction 
 
Criticism 
Russia 
Strongly condems the killing of Boris Nemtsov and 
pays tribute to him as an opposition leader and 
leading critic of Putin. The political atmosphere 
which the Russian authorities have created has 
prepared for a fertile ground for muders, violence 
and pressure.  
5. 2014/2816(INI)  
 
Report on the 
Conclusion of the AA 
with Georgia 
European 
integration 
Welcomes warmly the signature of the AA as a 
significant step forward in EU-Georgia relations, 
the ratification and embodying a commitment to the 
path of political association and economic 
integration. Georgia may apply to become a 
member if it adheres to the principles of 
democracy, respect for fundemental freedoms and 
human minority rights.  Congratulates Georgia on 
having been able to sustain external pressure from 
Russia and redirect exports towards new markets.  
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
 
Economic 
sanction 
 
Criticism 
Russia 
Calls on Russia to respect fully the sovereignity 
and territorial integrity of Georgia. 
6. 2014/0086(NLE)  
 
Recommendation of AA 
with Georgia  
European 
integration 
Encourages the establishment of a DCFTA 
between Georgia and the EU, which enable a 
future closer to Europe.  
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
 
Economic 
sanction 
 
Criticism 
Russia 
 
7. 2014/0250(COD)  
 
Autonomous Trade 
Preferences for the 
Republic of Moldova 
European 
integration 
As the results of Russia's politically motivated 
important bans against Moldova, as "an act of 
solidarity" and to improve trade relations between 
the EU and Moldova, ATP Regulations will be 
amended by introducing new duty-free tariff rate 
quotar for certain fruits.  
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
 
Economic  
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sanction 
Criticism 
Russia 
 
8. 2014/0154(NLE)  
 
Renewal of the 
Agreement on 
Cooperation in Science 
and Technology with 
Ukraine 
European 
integration 
Gives its consent to renewal of the agreement, 
which will improve and intensify cooperation.  
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
 
Economic 
sanction 
 
Criticism 
Russia 
 
9. 2014/0083(NLE)  
 
AA between the EU and 
the Republic of 
Moldova 
European 
integration 
Gives its consent to the conclusion of the 
agreement and the DCFTA to eliminate all import 
duties and prohibition of export duties on all goods 
on the EU side.  
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
 
Economic 
sanction 
 
Criticism 
Russia 
 
10. 2014/2817(INI)  
 
AA between the EU and 
Moldova 
European 
integration 
Warmly welcomes the signature of the AA, which 
is not a final goal in the EU-Moldova relations, as 
Moldova may apply to become a member of the EU 
provided it adheres to the principle of democracy, 
respects fundamentral freedoms and minority 
rights, and ensures rule of law. Fully supports the 
visa-free regime for Moldovan citizens.  
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
 
Economic 
sanction 
 
Criticism 
Russia 
Strongly deplores the continued use of trade by 
Russia as means to destablise the region by 
introducing several import bans on products from 
Moldova, in violation of Russia's WTO 
commitments. Is concerned over Russia's actions 
aimed at undermining the association process of 
the EU's Eastern Neighbours.  
11. 2014/0279(COD)  
 
Custom Duties on 
Goods Originating in 
Ukraine 
European 
integration 
Recommendation of the extention of autonomous 
trade measures (ATMs) with Ukraine.  
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
 
Economic 
sanction 
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Criticism 
Russia 
 
12. 2014/2841(RSP)  
 
Situation in Ukraine 
and State of Play of EU-
Russia Relations 
European 
integration 
Emphasises that the reform and Association 
agenda must proceed in parallel with the continued 
struggle to ensure Ukraine's territorial integrity and 
unity. Welcomes the simultaneous ratification of 
the AA/DCFTA.  
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
Calls on the Member States to cancel planned 
agreements with Russia in the energy sector.  
Economic 
sanction 
Welcomes the EU decision to prohibit imports 
originating from Crimea. Supports the restrictive 
measures the EU adopted against Russia. 
Criticism 
Russia 
Strongly condems Russia for waging an undeclared 
'hybrid war' against Ukraine with the use of 
Russian forces and supporting illegally armed 
groups. Deplores that the ceasefire agreement is 
persistently violated by, mainly, Russian troops 
and separatist forces. Strongly condems the 
unlawful abduction of an Estonian 
couterintelligence officer from Estonian territory to 
Russia.  
13. 2013/0151B(NLE) 
 
EU-Ukraine AA: 
Treatment of Third 
Country Nationals 
Legally Employed as 
Workers in the 
Territory of the Other 
Party 
European 
integration 
Gives its consent to conclusion of the AA the EU 
and Ukraine, of the other part, as regards 
provisions relating to the treatment of third-country 
nationals legally employed as workers in the 
territory of the other party.  
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
 
Economic 
sanction 
 
Criticism 
Russia 
 
14. 2013/0151A(NLE)  
 
EU-Ukraine AA: With 
the Exception of the 
Treatment of Third 
Country Nationals 
Legally Employed as 
Workers in the 
Territory of the Other 
Party 
European 
integration 
Gives its consent to conclusion of the AA.  
Dependenc
e Russian 
energy 
 
Economic 
sanction 
 
Criticism 
Russia 
 
15. 2014/2717(RSP)  
 
Situation in Ukraine 
European 
integration 
Welcomes the signing of the remaining provisions 
of the AA, including the DCFTA with Ukraine as 
well as Georgia and Moldova.   
Dependenc
e Russian 
Welcomes further sanctions against Russia 
including the energy sector. Further measures to 
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energy lower the EU's dependency on Russian gas must be 
a priority.  
Economic 
sanction 
Welcomes the decision to prohibit the import goods 
from Crimea and Sevastopol. Welcomes the 
extension of the current sanctions to further 11 
people and welcomes further sanctions against 
Russia, which should include the economic, 
financial and energy sectors and an arms and dual-
use technology embargo; calls for a collective ban 
on the sale of arms to Russia. 
Criticism 
Russia 
Condems Russia's aggression on Crimea as a grave 
violation under international law of Ukrainian 
sovereignity and territorial integrity. Considers the 
annexation of Crimea to be illegal and refuses to 
recognise Russian de facto rule on the peninsula. 
Deplores the illegal detension of Ukrainian air 
force navigator Nadija Savchenko in Russia.  
  56 
  
1. 
2015/2838(
RSP) 
2. 
2015/2036
(INI) 
3. 
2015/2001
(INI) 
4. 
2015/2592(
RSP) 
5. 
2014/2816
(INI) 
6. 
2014/0086(
NLE) 
7. 
2014/0250(
COD) 
8. 
2014/0154(
NLE) 
9. 
2014/0083(
NLE) 
10. 
2014/2817(
INI) 
11. 
2014/0279(
COD) 
12. 
2014/2841(
RSP) 
13. 
2013/0151B(
NLE) 
14. 
2013/0151A(
NLE) 
15. 
2014/2717(
RSP) 
Austria Barbara Kappel (FPÖ) ABST NO NO YES NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Austria Georg Mayer (FPÖ) ABST NO NO YES NO NO NO ABST . . NO YES NO NO NO 
Austria Franz Obermayr (FPÖ) ABST NO NO YES NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Austria Harald Vilimsky (FPÖ) ABST NO NO YES NO NO . ABST NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Belgium Gerolf Annemans (VB) ABST NO ABST YES NO NO . YES NO NO ABST YES NO NO NO 
Denmark Jørn Dohrmann (DF) YES ABST ABST . YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ABST ABST ABST YES 
Denmark 
Morten Messerschmidt 
(DF) YES . ABST YES YES YES . YES YES YES YES ABST ABST ABST YES 
Denmark 
Anders Primdahl 
Vistisen (DF) YES . ABST YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ABST ABST ABST YES 
Finland Jussi-Halla-Aho (PS) YES YES YES YES . . YES YES . . YES ABST YES YES YES 
Finland 
Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner 
(PS) . YES YES . . . . . . .  . . . . . 
Finland Sampo Terho (PS) . . . YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ABST YES YES YES 
France Louis Aliot (FN) NO NO NO NO . . NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France 
Marie-Christine Arnautu 
(FN) NO NO NO . NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France Nicolas Bay (FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France Dominique Bilde (FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France 
Marie-Christine 
Boutonnet (FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France Steeve Briois (FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France Mireille D'Ornano (FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO . YES NO NO NO 
France Edouard Ferrand (FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France Sylvie Goddyn (FN) NO NO NO NO . . NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France Bruno Gollnisch (FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO . . . NO YES NO NO NO 
France 
Jean-François Jalkh 
(FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO . NO NO NO 
France Gilles Lebreton (FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France Jean-Marie Le Pen (FN) . . . . . . NO NO . . . YES NO NO NO 
France Marine Le Pen (FN) NO NO NO NO . . NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France Philippe Loiseau (FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France Dominique Martin (FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France Joëlle Melin (FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO . . NO YES NO NO NO 
France Bernard Monot (FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO . NO NO NO 
France Sophie Montel (FN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France Florian Philippot (FN) NO NO NO . NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
France 
Myléne Troszczynski 
(FN) NO NO NO NO . . NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Germany 
Beatrix von Storch 
(AfD) YES NO NO YES ABST ABST NO ABST NO NO ABST YES NO NO . 
Germany Marcus Pretzell (AfD) ABST NO NO YES ABST ABST NO ABST NO NO YES YES NO NO NO 
Germany Udo Voight (NPD) .  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Greece 
Georgios Epitideios 
(Golden Dawn) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Greece 
Lampros Fountoulis 
(Golden Dawn) NO . . NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
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Greece 
Eleftherios Synadinos 
(Golden Dawn) NO . NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Hungary Zoltán Balczó (Jobbik) NO NO NO ABST NO NO ABST NO NO NO NO YES NO ABST NO 
Hungary Béla Kovács (Jobbik) . NO NO ABST . . ABST . . . NO YES . . NO 
Hungary 
Krisztina Morvai 
(Jobbik) NO NO NO . NO NO ABST NO NO NO NO ABST NO ABST . 
Italy Mara Bizzotto (LN)  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Italy Mario Borghezio (LN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Italy 
Gianluca Buonnanno 
(LN) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Italy Lorenzo Fontana (LN) . NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Italy Matteo Salvini (LN) . . NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO . NO NO . 
Latvia Roberts Zīle (NA) YES YES YES . . . YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Lithuania Rolandas Paksas (TT) YES ABST ABST YES . . . . YES YES . . . . YES 
Netherlan
ds Vicky Maeijer (PVV) NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Netherlan
ds Olaf Stuger (PVV) NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Netherlan
ds Auke Zijlstra (PVV) . NO . . . . NO . . . . . . . . 
Netherlan
ds Marcel de Graaff (PVV) NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Netherlan
ds Hans Jansen (PVV)         NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Sweden Peter Lundgren (SD) YES ABST ABST YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO 
Sweden Kristina Winberg (SD) YES ABST ABST YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO 
United 
Kingdom 
John Stuart Agnew 
(UKIP) ABST NO NO YES . NO NO NO NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO 
United 
Kingdom Julia Reid (UKIP) . NO NO YES NO NO NO NO .  NO NO ABST NO NO NO 
United 
Kingdom Tim Aker (UKIP) . NO NO . . . NO NO NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO 
United 
Kingdom Jonathan Arnott (UKIP) ABST NO NO YES NO NO . NO NO NO . ABST NO NO NO 
United 
Kingdom Gerard Batten (UKIP) . NO NO YES . . . . NO NO NO . . . NO 
United 
Kingdom Louise Bours (UKIP) ABST NO NO . . . NO NO NO NO . . NO NO . 
United 
Kingdom James Carver (UKIP) ABST NO NO YES NO NO . NO NO NO NO . NO NO NO 
United 
Kingdom David Coburn (UKIP) ABST NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO . . . NO 
United 
Kingdom Jane Collins (UKIP) ABST NO NO . . . NO NO NO YES NO ABST NO NO . 
United 
Kingdom 
William (The Earl of) 
Dartmouth (UKIP) . . NO . NO NO . NO NO NO NO . . . . 
United 
Kingdom Steven Woolfe (UKIP) ABST NO NO ABST NO NO . NO NO NO . . NO NO NO 
United 
Kingdom Jill Seymour (UKIP) ABST NO NO . NO NO NO NO NO NO NO ABST NO NO . 
United 
Kingdom Bill Etheridge (UKIP) ABST . NO ABST NO NO NO NO NO NO . ABST NO NO NO 
United 
Kingdom Nigel Farage (UKIP) ABST . NO . . . NO NO NO NO . . NO NO . 
United 
Kingdom Raymond Finch (UKIP) ABST NO NO YES NO NO . NO NO NO . . NO NO . 
United 
Kingdom Nathan Gill (UKIP) ABST NO NO YES NO . NO NO NO NO NO ABST NO NO . 
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United 
Kingdom Roger Helmer (UKIP) ABST NO NO YES NO NO . NO . . NO ABST NO NO NO 
United 
Kingdom Mike Hookem (UKIP) ABST NO NO ABST NO NO NO NO NO NO NO ABST NO NO . 
United 
Kingdom Diane James (UKIP) ABST NO NO . NO NO NO NO NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO 
United 
Kingdom Paul Nuttall (UKIP) ABST NO NO . . . . NO NO NO . . NO NO . 
United 
Kingdom Patrick O'Flynn (UKIP) ABST NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO 
United 
Kingdom Margot Parker (UKIP) ABST . .  . NO NO . NO NO NO NO . NO NO NO 
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2013/0151A(
NLE) 
15. 
2014/2717(R
SP) 
Austria FPÖ ABST NO NO YES NO NO NO 
 
NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Belgium VB ABST NO ABST YES NO NO . ABST NO NO ABST YES NO NO NO 
Denmark DF YES ABST ABST YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ABST 0 ABST YES 
Finland PS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ABST YES YES YES 
France FN NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Germany AfD  YES* NO NO YES ABST ABST NO ABST NO NO 
Tvetydigt: 
YES YES NO NO NO 
Germany NPD .  NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Greece 
Golden 
Dawn NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Hungary Jobbik NO NO NO ABST NO NO ABST NO NO NO NO YES NO ABST NO 
Italy  LN NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Latvia NA YES YES YES . . . YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Lithuania TT YES ABST ABST YES . . . . YES YES . . . . YES 
Netherland
s PVV NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Sweden SD YES ABST ABST YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO 
United 
Kingdom UKIP ABST NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO 
 
  59 
  
1. 
2015/2838(
RSP) 
2. 
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3. 
2015/2001
(INI) 
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2014/0154(
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2014/0083(
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10. 
2014/2817(
INI) 
11. 
2014/0279(C
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12. 
2014/2841(
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13. 
2013/0151B(
NLE) 
14. 
2013/0151A(
NLE) 
15. 
2014/2717(
RSP) 
Cyprus 
Takis Hadjigeorgiou 
(AKEL) NO NO NO ABST ABST ABST YES NO ABST NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Cyprus  
Neoklis Sylikiotis 
(AKEL) NO NO NO ABST NO ABST YES NO YES NO ABST NO NO NO NO 
Czech 
Republic 
Kateřina Konečná 
(KSCM) . NO NO NO . . YES YES NO NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Czech 
Republic Jiří Maštálka (KSCM) . NO NO NO ABST ABST YES YES NO NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Czech 
Republic 
Miloslav Ransdorf 
(KSCM) . NO NO NO . . . .  NO NO . ABST NO NO NO 
Denmark Margrete Auken (SF) YES ABST ABST YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ABST YES YES YES 
Finland 
Merja Kyllönen (Left 
Alliance)  YES ABST ABST YES ABST ABST . NO . . ABST ABST ABST ABST ABST 
France 
Patrick Le Hyaric 
(PCF) . NO NO YES ABST ABST YES NO . . ABST ABST NO NO NO 
France 
Jean-Luc Mélenchon 
(PG) . NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Germany 
Cornelia Ernst (Die 
Linke) NO NO NO YES ABST ABST . NO NO NO . . NO NO NO 
Germany 
Thomas Händel (Die 
Linke) NO NO NO . . . . .  . . . . . . . 
Germany 
Sabine Lösing (Die 
Linke) NO NO NO ABST NO NO YES NO NO NO ABST ABST . . . 
Germany 
Martina Michels (Die 
Linke) NO NO NO YES ABST ABST YES NO ABST ABST . ABST NO NO NO 
Germany 
Helmut Scholz (Die 
Linke) NO NO NO . ABST ABST YES NO ABST ABST ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Germany 
Gabriele Zimmer (Die 
Linke) NO NO NO YES ABST ABST YES NO ABST ABST ABST NO NO NO NO 
Germany 
Fabio de Masi (Die 
Linke) NO NO NO . NO NO . NO . . ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Greece 
Kostas Chrysognos 
(Syriza) NO NO NO ABST ABST ABST YES NO ABST ABST ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Greece 
Stelios Kouloglou 
(Syriza) . NO NO . . . YES . . . . . . . NO 
Greece 
Kostadinka Kuneva 
(Syriza) . . NO ABST ABST ABST YES NO ABST ABST . NO NO NO NO 
Greece 
Dimitrios 
Papadimoulis (Syriza) NO NO NO ABST ABST ABST YES NO ABST ABST ABST NO NO NO NO 
Greece 
Manolis Glezos 
(Syriza) . NO NO ABST ABST ABST YES NO NO ABST ABST . NO NO NO 
Greece 
Konstantinos 
Papadakis (KKE) NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Greece 
Sotiros Zarianopoulos 
(KKE) . NO NO ABST NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Ireland 
Lynn Boylan (Sinn 
Féin) . NO ABST YES NO ABST . NO ABST ABST NO ABST NO NO . 
Ireland 
Matt Carthy  (Sinn 
Féin) YES NO ABST YES NO ABST YES NO ABST ABST NO ABST NO NO . 
Ireland 
Liadh Ni Riada (Sinn 
Féin) YES NO ABST . . . . NO ABST ABST NO ABST NO NO . 
Netherla
nds Dennis de Jong (SP) . NO NO ABST NO NO . NO NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO 
Netherla
nds 
Anne-Marie Mineur 
(SP) . NO NO ABST NO NO . NO NO NO . ABST NO NO NO 
Portugal 
João Ferreira 
(CDU/PCP) . . NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Portugal 
Miguel Viegas 
(CDU/PCP) . . NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
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Portugal 
Inês Cristina Zuber 
(CDU/PCP) NO . NO YES NO NO NO NO . . ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Portugal 
Marisa Matias (Left 
Bloc) NO NO ABST ABST ABST ABST YES NO NO NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Spain 
Marina Albiol 
Guzmán (IU) NO . NO YES NO NO YES NO NO NO . NO NO NO NO 
Spain 
Javier Couso Permuy 
(IU) NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO NO 
Spain 
Paloma López 
Bermejo (IU) NO NO NO NO NO NO . NO . . ABST NO NO NO NO 
Spain Angela Vallina (IU) . NO NO NO . . . . NO NO ABST NO NO NO NO 
Spain 
Pablo Echenique 
(Podemos) . . . . ABST ABST YES NO NO NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Spain 
Tania Gonzalez Peñas 
(Podemos) ABST NO NO YES ABST ABST YES NO NO NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Spain 
Pablo Iglesias 
(Podemos) . . . . ABST ABST YES NO NO NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Spain 
Lola Sánchez 
Caldentey (Podemos) ABST NO NO YES ABST ABST YES NO NO NO ABST ABST NO NO . 
Spain 
Teresa Rodriguez-
Rubio (Podemos) .   
 
  ABST ABST YES NO NO NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Spain 
Estefanía Torres 
Martínez (Podemos) ABST . NO . . . . .  . . . . . . . 
Spain 
Miguel Urbán Crespo 
(Podemos) ABST NO NO YES . . . .  . . . . . . . 
Sweden Malin Björk (V) YES . ABST ABST ABST YES YES YES YES YES YES 0 YES YES ABST 
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Cyprus AKEL NO NO NO ABST NO* ABST YES NO 
Tvetydigt: 
NO NO ABST 
Tvetydigt: 
NO NO NO NO 
Czech 
Republic KSCM . NO NO NO ABST ABST YES YES 
 
NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Denmark SF YES ABST ABST YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES ABST YES YES YES 
Finland 
Left 
Alliance YES ABST ABST YES ABST ABST . NO . . ABST ABST ABST ABST ABST 
France PCF . NO NO YES ABST ABST YES NO . . ABST ABST NO NO NO 
France PG . NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Germany 
Die 
Linke NO NO NO YES ABST ABST YES NO 0 0 ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Greece Syriza NO NO NO ABST ABST ABST YES NO 0 0 ABST NO NO NO NO 
Greece KKE NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Ireland 
Sinn 
Féin YES NO ABST YES NO ABST YES NO 0 0 NO NO NO NO . 
Netherlan
ds SP . NO NO ABST NO NO . NO NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO 
Portugal 
CDU/P
CP NO . NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Portugal 
Left 
Bloc NO NO ABST ABST ABST ABST YES NO NO NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Spain IU NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO ABST NO NO NO NO 
Spain 
Podemo
s ABST NO NO YES ABST ABST YES NO NO NO ABST ABST NO NO NO 
Sweden V YES . ABST ABST ABST YES YES YES YES YES YES ABST YES YES ABST 
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Appendix 3.  
 
 
Variable vote_comb tested for normal distribution. Variable not log-transformed:  
 
 
Frequency table for variable vote_comb:  
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Normal distribution and log-transformation of variable eu_position:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test for normal distribution of variable nationalism. Variable not log-transformed:  
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Test for normal distribution of variable antielite_salience. Variable not log-transformed: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control for outliers in variable vote_comb and ln_eu_position:   
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Control for outliers in variable nationalism and antielite_salience:    
    
 
Scatter plot showing correlation between vote_comb and nationalism: 
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Scatter plot showing correlation between vote_comb and east_orth: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scatter plot showing correlation between vote_comb and govern:  
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Scatter plot showing correlation between vote_comb and hist_ties: 
 
 
 
 
Scatter plot showing correlation between vote_comb and antielite_salience:  
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Model summary and ANOVA for model 6:  
 
 
